Mapping Controversies

Gender and Corruption

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Introduction

One of the most powerful countries in Latin America and a leading emerging economy within the BRICs\(^1\), Brazil, has a female Head of State, Dilma Rousseff. Incidentally, this country is also 76th out of 168 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, registering the biggest plunge in the Index’s ratings in 2015. This plunge is a reflection of the allegations surrounding Petrobras, also referred to as the Lava jato scandal, and the economic and political crisis the government currently faces. Admittedly, the crisis that Brazil is struggling with is complicated, and as such presents an interesting, and unfolding, case study to use when discussing gender and corruption. As the calls for the impeachment of President Rousseff have intensified and accusations of her alleged corruptness gain momentum in the press, it is pertinent here to address the gender component of Brazil’s leadership crisis: on one hand, most of these Brazilian politicians implicated in the scandal are men - yet, on the other hand, the head of State is a woman. Jonathan Watts, The Guardian correspondent, aptly summarized Rousseff’s thoughts on the gender question, suggesting that a driving factor pushing for impeachment is Brazil’s culture of machismo, which according to Rousseff has contributed to the fueling the desire for impeachment of the country’s first female president:

> Mixed up in all this is a degree of prejudice against women. There are attitudes towards me that would not exist with a male president.\(^2\)

Why are there calls for Rousseff to be replaced, when her Vice President Michel Temer is equally as corrupt? Is corruption worse when committed by a woman? Are women supposed to be less corrupt? Does it matter? If corruption is as old as time itself, why has gender entered the debate? These are questions that will be explored in this study mapping the literature on gender and corruption, a concept that entered academia in the early 2000s. Introduced by Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), groups of academics have sought to prove that women are the fairer sex, and therefore are intrinsically less corrupt than men. These authors’ interest was piqued by The Washington Post’s article on Mexico City’s police institution creating an all-female force, in a bid to tackle corruption amongst policemen. Around the same time, a similar policy was implemented in Lima, Peru, as reported by The Daily Telegraph (Swamy et al., 2001). These founding papers on gender and corruption have led to an increase in public calls to ‘add women and stir’ as a valuable strategy in the fight against corruption.

Our study consists in the analysis of a database of over 200 articles, which were carefully compiled and combed through. In order to foster an intellectual reflection on this controversy, academic findings are also complemented by seven interviews with a range of specialists on either gender, corruption, or both, notably Dr. Anne-Marie Goetz, Dr Heather Marquette, Dr Naomi Hossain, Dr Lena Wängnerud, Dr Celestine Nyamu Musembi, Dr Olivier Armantier and Mr. Frédéric Brassac.

This paper will thus first explore the aforementioned founding papers, analyzing their methodology and highlighting how they come to conclude that women are less corrupt than men. The body of literature that reinforces this essentialist notion on the behavior of women will then be examined, with a particular focus on the use of experiments and the discussion

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\(^1\) Brazil, Russia India, China
of certain cultures. Next, moving away from the myth created around the fairer sex, the second part of this study will concentrate on examining alternative explanations pointing towards the idea that it may not be a question of fairer sex, but of a fairer system. Thirdly and finally, our work will address the controversies and criticisms surrounding the measurement of corruption, and will subsequently work towards deconstructing the notion that there necessarily exists a gendered dichotomy when it comes to corruption and analyzing the effects of what has been presented as a fact: that women are less corrupt than men. This paper will conclude by noting that research on gender and corruption often falsely address gender and reinforce stereotypes, rather than promoting women.
1. The Fairer Sex argument

1.1. Two founding papers begin a lively debate

This section will address the beginning of the emergence of the gender and corruption controversy. It will present how the two founding papers attempt to establish a scientific fact, while acknowledging uncertainties and fragilities of their work. The two founding papers opened the way for a lively debate involving different fields of social science and moved out from the purely scientific field towards the policy-making sphere.

1.1.1. Establishing a “scientific fact”

This section discusses the two founding papers published in 2001: David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti’s article "Are women really the 'fairer' sex? Corruption and women in government" and Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Young, Lee, and Omar, Azfar's article “Gender and corruption.”

1.1.1.1. The two founding papers

Both studies start from the observation of diverse sources going in the same direction: be it behavioral studies (lab experiments or survey based), whose conclusions can support the idea of a “fairer sex,” or policy measures, which rely upon this idea (e.g. increasing women in the police force in Mexico City, or Lima, as cited by Swamy et al., 2001). The authors seek to support this evidence by more systematic 'scientific reasoning'. Are women more "altruistic" and less corrupt? These two articles lay the groundwork in the “gender and corruption" field by trying to establish a scientific statement. Their approach, however, is fragile, as we will see.

The Dollar et al. (2001) paper is a very short article of 5 pages. It uses an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on a sample of about 100 countries, linking corruption data from International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) corruption index, and the proportion of female representatives in parliaments from the Inter-parliamentary Union’s (1995) survey. The ICRG index captures the likelihood that high government officials will demand special payments, and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout low levels of government. The authors also add a few control variables: GDP indicators (log GDP, log GDP²), civil liberty index, log of population, education level of the population, openness to trade, ethnic fractionalization, and some dummies; regional dummies, colonial dummies, and legal origin dummies. The coefficient of the correlation is significantly positive at 1%. It implies that one standard deviation increase in the proportion of parliamentary seats that were held by women in the upper and lower Houses correlates with a decline in corruption of 20 percent of a standard deviation (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti, 2001: 427). Consistent with this micro-level evidence, the authors found that at the country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption. The authors conclude the following:

*We find a strong, negative, and statistically significant relationship between the proportion of women in a country’s legislature and the level of corruption, as measured by the ICRG corruption index (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti, 2001: 424).*
The Swamy et al. paper (2001) is longer, using more data presented as an accumulation of "evidence" at different levels in order to evaluate "the plausibility of such claims, using a variety of independent data sources" (Swamy et al. 2001: 26). The authors use three sets of data to look at the micro and macro levels: The World Value Survey (social perception and acceptance of corruption), a World Bank study on firms in Georgia, and a cross-country analysis on perception of corruption with control variables, similar to the Dollar et al. approach, but based on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).

The World Values Survey data on the acceptability of dishonest behaviors in hypothetical situations revealed gender differences in attitudes to bribery in developed and developing countries:

A man’s likelihood of responding that accepting a bribe is “never justified” is 4.3 percentage points less than the likelihood for a woman (Swamy et al. 2001: 32).

Although this differential is not diametrical, it is consistent when aggregating over all countries in the surveys. The 1991 data shows that in 24 of 43 countries, the gender differential favors women and is statistically significant at 5%. Moreover, the surveys from 1981 show that the gender differential favors women in the 18 analyzed countries and that in nine cases, the differential is statistically significant at 5% (Swamy et al. 2001: 33).

In the enterprise surveys conducted by the World Bank in Georgia, managers of 350 firms were asked about contact with and illegal payments made to different government agencies. The results showed a high incidence of corruption since firms reported paying an average of 155 dollars per month or 9% of turnover on average (Anderson et al., 1999). The micro-evidence suggests the existence of a gender differential in involvement in bribery.

Firms owned or managed by women gave bribes on average on 4.6% of the occasions that they came in contact with a government agency; the average percentage was more than twice as large for firms owned/managed by men, 12.5% (Swamy et al., 2001: 36).

For the country-level analysis, corruption was measured using the indices developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), Transparency International, and Political Risk Services. For the purpose of this research, Swamy et al. (2001) uses the CPI, which is based on annual surveys conducted with expert advisors, regional specialists and high ranking business executives. The perceptions and opinions are collected indirectly through secondary sources. The CPI 2015 index collected data from the African Development Bank, the World Bank, Freedom House, Bertelsmann Foundation, among other regional and international institutions. The female proportion of legislators in the national parliament, ministers and high-level government bureaucrats and women’s share of the labor force act as proxies to measure women’s involvement in politics and commerce. Estimates from cross-country tests found that greater participation by women in market work and government is associated with lower levels of corruption. One standard deviation increase in women’s share of parliamentary seats is associated with an increase in the corruption index of slightly more than one-fifth of a standard deviation. Women’s share of top ministerial/bureaucratic positions and share of the labor force is significant; the coefficient is nearly identical to that of women in parliament:

Where women’s labor force shares and women’s participation at elite levels of the government are each significant, is that the former captures women’s influence in reducing petty corruption, while the latter captures primarily women’s impact on reducing grand corruption (Swamy et al. 2001: 43).
The three analyses (two at the micro level and one at the macro level) all have similar positive correlations, leading the authors to affirm the following conclusion:

We present evidence that a. in hypothetical situations, women are less likely to condone corruption, b. women managers are less involved in bribery, and c. countries which have greater representation of women in government or in market work have lower levels of corruption. This evidence, taken together, provides some support for the idea that, at least in the short or medium term, increased presence of women in public life will reduce levels of corruption (Swamy et al. 2001: 26).

Thus, Swamy et al. (2001) also find that increasing both the number of women in parliaments and in the labor force would reduce grand and petty corruption. The positive link between gender and corruption found by both Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001) led to policy implications to increase women’s representation as a means to combat corruption.

1.1.1.2. Pitfalls of the founding papers

Since their publication, many scholars have criticized the two founding papers in their approach and methodology.

First, some critics have focused on the indexes used in the articles, showing their limits. For instance, the CPI used by Swamy et al. (2001) measures only the perception of public sector corruption (i.e. administrative and governmental). It does not take into consideration small-scale petty-corruption in business transactions. Nor does it consider how women’s experiences and corruption practices may differ from men. The construction of the CPI disregards the fact that in a large number of countries, women are not involved in the public domain due to political and cultural constraints. Thus, the statistical relationship found between lower levels of corruption and women’s participation in politics and the labor force based on aggregated data may be spurious.

Furthermore, collecting data based on perceptions rather than instances of corruption could lead to biased information. Perception-based indexes may influence the actual opinion on corruption through the media, thus increasing the possibilities of the indexes influencing the same perception on which they are constructed. In this sense, media coverage reinforces perceptions of corruption, creating a vicious cycle between perceptions and facts. Subjective information, opinions and perceptions cannot reflect the complexity of the actual corruption level in a country. Moreover, powerful intellectual and economic elites respond to the surveys and they may provide only partial information misleading the popular perceptions of corruption. For instance, the use of data measuring the perception of corruption in Dollar et al. (2001), by businessmen or foreign investors, does not necessarily say much about the reality of petty corruption or everyday corruption as experienced by ordinary citizens (Goetz, 2007: 93).

In addition, the annual surveys do not clearly define the aspects of corruption and governance they intend to measure. Concepts such as conflict of interest, diversion of funds and anti-corruption efforts are not explicitly defined, affecting the universal validity of the results. The divergent interpretation of the variables makes cross-national comparison more difficult and restricts the scope of the findings. Even countries with similar classifications or rank in a corruption index could have vastly dissimilar experiences since the secondary sources of information vary between years and the implicit definitions may change according to the cultural context. These factors limit the comparison among countries and through
different time periods. Moreover, the clandestine nature of corruption hinders the measurement of this variable due to the fact that those engaged in corrupt transactions as bribe suppliers or takers do not have incentives to admit their actions (Byrne, Arnold and Nagano, 2009: 18).

Thus, we lack an appropriate dataset to truly address the issue of gender and corruption. This limits the extent to which we can understand the correlation between gender and corruption.

Moreover, scholars have criticized the founding papers for their methodology, notably the way in which they use aggregate data to make conclusions about the individual level. Sung underlines the problematic use of cross-level inferences:

\[
\text{The policy recommendations suggested in these two studies originated from the cross-level inferences that researchers assumed to be true and valid, and not directly from their data (Sung, 2003: 706).}
\]

Although survey questions used in Swamy et al. (2001) were phrased to show that the impetus for the bribe came from the public officials to avoid placing the responsibility on the respondent, aiming to obtain more honest responses, some concerns about self-reported corruption data exist. The micro-evidence from surveys could reflect gender differentials in acknowledging corruption instead of providing reliable information on incidences of corruption. To correct this methodological problem, the authors use national-level corruption ratings that are not self-reported, “so that any gender differentials cannot be produced by male–female differences in the willingness to acknowledge corruption” (Swamy et al. 2001: 37). However, macro-level evidence does not carry the necessary implications for the micro-level relationship between women’s participation in government and the severity of corruption in public life.

The cross-country analysis presents a statistically robust gender differential. The possibility of omitted variable bias, however, cannot be entirely ruled out in cross-sectional regressions. Especially taking into consideration that data on women’s share of lower-level government positions is not available and that the authors used women’s share of labor force as the closest proxy which captures, to some extent, tendencies of corruption in the private sector.

While the findings are statistically robust, the authors do not attempt to analyze alternative interpretations. In Swamy et al. (2001), the authors merely state that women may be less prone to bribery than men because they are

\[
\text{Less likely to belong to bribe-sharing old boy networks […] It could also be that, due to less individual or collective experience in the labor force, women have not yet “learned” how to engage in corruption (Swamy et al. 2001: 36).}
\]

Furthermore, as long as women remain a minority that has little influence on public life,

\[
\text{Male–female difference in attitudes and behavior may be too small for an increase in women’s participation in commerce and government to move society from a highly corrupt to a less corrupt equilibrium (Swamy et al. 2001: 36).}
\]

While these alternatives represent mere afterthoughts for Swamy et al. (2001), numerous authors explore these relationships more in-depth. We will see in greater detail how these two papers were criticized and the debates that they have created later sections.
1.1.2. Acknowledging uncertainties

While the founding authors present their findings as scientific fact, the vocabulary used in their conclusions appears to acknowledge uncertainties. Nonetheless, each paper offers its fair share of policy recommendations based upon the conclusion that more women in government means less corruption.

1.1.2.1. A cautious rhetoric

Despite the confidence with which institutions picked up the conclusions of the founding papers, it seems as though the authors were aware of the fragility of their findings. The style used in the conclusions appears quite striking; the authors present their conclusions in a rather cautious manner: "may", "suggest" (Dollar et al. 2001), "plausible", "make a strong case" (Swamy et al. 2001).

Though questions can be raised regarding each of the three sets of evidence we have assembled, they reinforce each other, and taken together, make a strong case...

We are making a simple point: to question the central finding of this paper, one needs to argue that the results of careful analyses of several distinct data sets have, by sheer fluke, all been biased in the same direction. Our conclusion, that there is indeed a gender differential in tolerance for corruption, is more plausible [emphasis added] (Swamy et al. 2001: 51).

Dollar et al. also acknowledge the possibility of another factor not controlled:

Obviously, some care [emphasis added] is required in interpreting our results. Since we are dealing with cross-country data, it may be that some unobserved variable [emphasis added] is causing both high female participation in government and low corruption. We have tried to mitigate these concerns [emphasis added] by including in our regressions variables to control for various underlying institutional characteristics that would most likely be responsible for such a spurious correlation (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001: 427).

This very cautious discourse could also be an attempt to avoid accusations of the essentialization of women. This is particularly visible in the Swamy and al. (2001) paper:

Claims about gender differences can easily be misinterpreted. It is therefore important for us to clarify that we do not claim to have discovered some essential, permanent, or biologically determined differences between men and women (Swamy et al. 2001: 26).

It is interesting to see that these first papers are mostly aimed at showing the existence of a relation, but then rely on other fields to propose explanations that are “consistent” with their results. For example, Swamy et al. (2001) state: “We do not attempt to identify these underlying factors, but rather to document several statistically robust relationships that point towards a gender differential in the incidence of corruption” (26); “We are reassured to learn that our evidence is entirely consistent with the findings of leading criminologists” (51). As pioneers of the gender and corruption field, the authors rely on the social sciences to give weight to their newly identified supposed scientific fact.

1.1.2.2. But still leading to policy recommendations

Despite the abovementioned uncertainties, both papers draw distinct policy suggestions, encouraging proactive policies to favor the participation of women in politics, not only for the
sake of a better representation, but also for the spillover effects it could have on a given society, namely on corruption.

Increasing the presence of women in government may be valued for its own sake, for reasons of gender equality. However, our results suggest that there may be extremely important spin-offs stemming from increasing female representation: if women are less likely than men to behave opportunistically, then bringing more women into government may have significant benefits for society in general (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti, 2001: 427-428).

Swamy et al. (2001) also conclude with policy recommendations, putting forward the hypothesis that policies fostering the participation of women in politics and the labor market would have a real impact also on corruption levels, even if the gender differential in corruption behaviors is culturally-based.

While both sets of authors are eager to offer a cure of corruption, both papers ponder the viability of the gender and corruption nexus in the future: “it is worth asking whether they will persist as the position of women in society changes and their participation in the labor force increases.” (Swamy et al. 2001: 53). Nonetheless, Swamy et al. (2001) conclude in the same way as Dollar et al. (2001) by supporting their findings as a sufficient fix for the time being:

We suspect the gender differential in corruption will be stable in the medium term, and policy initiatives like those discussed at the beginning of this paper will indeed reduce corruption (Swamy et al. 2001: 53).

Despite the critiques that can be made, these two papers have opened an entire field of research, not to mention a controversy. Each of these papers has been cited well over 500 times according to Google Scholar. While many of the following scholars discussed in this paper do not agree with either the conclusions, methodology, or approach of Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), these two papers remain the starting point to delve into the gender and corruption controversy.

1.1.3. Opening a debate – who takes part in the controversy?

While the two founding papers were both published in economic journals and rely heavily on OLS and econometric methods, the controversy now includes a wide variety of disciplines each with a particular perspective or focus of the debate.

1.1.3.1. Social scientists and policy makers

Although the articles looking at the controversy often use the terminology “gender and corruption,” a more accurate representation of the thesis question would ask: “are women less corrupt than men?”. The distinction between gender - a complex social concept - and sex - a much simpler binary biological concept - is blurred in the vast majority of articles.

As mentioned above, since the beginning of the controversy, from the publication of the founding papers, policy-making has played a central role in the debate. The policy implications of the controversy are such that international organizations participate in the debate as well as scholars. The United Nations has been particularly active, UNIFEM and UNDP³ have published reports regarding gender and corruption. International NGOs have also published policy briefs on this topic, notably Transparency International.⁴

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³ Naomi Hossain, Celestine Nyamu Musembi, and Jessica Hughes, “Corruption, Accountability and Gender: Understanding the Connections,” Primers in Gender and Democratic Governance (UNDP

⁴ [Link to page 10 of 67]
1.1.3.2. Which fields & approaches?

Scholars from a variety of fields have been involved in this debate. Some scholars have an economics background following the trend of the founding papers: dealing with econometrics, behavioral economics, development economics (publishing in *European Economic Review, Economic Journal; Journal of Economic Issues; Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization; Applied Economics; Econometrica; Research in Experimental Economics; Journal of Economic Psychology; Journal of Public Economics*, to name a few).

Scholars have also come from political science backgrounds or approach the controversy through a gender studies lens (publishing in *Crime, Law & Social Change, Party Politics, Political Studies, Social Science Quarterly, Politics & Gender; Women, Politics and Policy; Gender & Society*).

The wide diversity of publications and their respective fields shows the variety of approaches and schools of thought that have stimulated the debate.

1.1.3.3. Which methods?

Using applied economics or econometrics in corruption studies can present a challenge due to its clandestine nature. In order to examine the relationship between gender and corruption, scholars have applied quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. Multiple regression analysis is the most commonly used statistical method in both the economics and political science literature. To overcome the lack of “hard data”, scholars use perception-based corruption indexes in empirical research.

When dealing with cross-country data, some unobserved factors may disrupt the strength and direction of the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. Researchers have included control variables underlying institutional characteristics to mitigate these concerns and guard against exogeneity. These variables include income, population size, political and civil freedom, average years of schooling, openness to trade, ethnic fractionalization and dummies such as region, colonial heritage and legal origin.

The statistical approach has been criticized because of the potential for significant measurement errors (Golden and Picci, 2005; Kaufmann et al., 2006).

> Reliable microdata on corrupt behavior are hard to obtain in the field, and available field data are hard to interpret. Laboratory corruption experiments have therefore recently gained in popularity (Frank et al. 2011).

The majority of laboratory experiments are designed to reproduce a corruption scenario in which the candidates participate in bribery-transactions as senders or receivers. This alternative approach offers two main advantages in comparison with statistical methods:

> First, corrupt behavior is unambiguously observed at the individual level; second, the researcher controls both the institutional environment and the characteristics of the subjects’ population (Armantier and Boly, 2013: 1168).

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Under these circumstances, researchers have the opportunity to identify micro-determinants of corruption such as gender, religion and age; and possible corruption deterrents, including monitoring mechanisms, higher wages and punishment.

Laboratory experiments have become an important tool to understand corruption, however, experimental literature is still at a preliminary stage. Two concerns may arise concerning their validity:

First, do laboratory experiments on corruption conducted in a developed and a developing country produce similar outcomes? Second, to what extent can the results of corruption experiments obtained in the laboratory be extrapolated to the field? (Armantier and Boly, 2013: 1169)

Several studies have shown that laboratory experiments fail to incorporate relevant external features, such as the influence of environment, culture and population; this leads to producing different results than field experiments. (Harrison and List, 2004; List, 2006). This phenomenon may be caused by the divergent levels of scrutiny between laboratory and field experiments since laboratory subjects know in advance that researchers will monitor and examine their behavior:

Because of this scrutiny, it has been hypothesized […] that laboratory subjects may be more inclined to make the 'moral' choice when morality and wealth are competing objectives, as it is the case with corruption. In addition, although non-monetary considerations (e.g. moral, ethical, legal) may be major determinants of corruption, they may be difficult to capture in the laboratory (Armantier and Boly 2013: 1169).

1.1.3.4. What geographical scope?

The issue of universality (or not) of the conclusions drawn from the articles is an issue, as soon as you acknowledge the social and cultural nature of gender relations and of corruption (considered in different ways according to the cultural context).

Some articles deal with world-wide data or a wide range of countries, depending on the data available. This is the case for the two founding papers, where the conclusions are intended to be universal. Some of the studies that followed, however, limit their analysis to “democratic-leaning countries” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016), or at the regional level (Stockemer, 2011), or focus on one particular country (India in Vijayalakshmi, 2008, or Nigeria in Marquette, 2012).

Thus, the two founding papers have sparked a debate where stakeholders, researchers and policymakers alike have taken a position. Each article proposes a particular approach to the controversy, using a range of methodologies. Perhaps more importantly, each author offers their own nuanced interpretation of the founding papers and throws their own conclusions into the mix.
1.2. Establishing women as the fairer sex

While Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001) clearly initiated the construction of the academic field on gender and corruption, scientific experiments conducted both before and after 2001 have contributed to reinforcing this idea that women are less corrupt than men – thus adding to an essential construction of women as the fairer sex. These experiments particularly focus on scientifically proving differences between men and women with regards to personality and behavior that could justify the position that women are less corrupt than men. In turn, certain findings add to the essential belief that, due to women’s intrinsically more honest and trustworthy personalities, women would serve as an effective and necessary anti-corruption measure when integrated within public representation circles.

Essentialism is a theory describing how the laws of nature relate to the world; that is to say, the laws of nature depend on “the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them” (Ellis, 2001: 1). Transposing this on to the controversy in question, this framing dictates that women are less corrupt than men simply because they are inherently better – less selfish, more caring – or, as Dr Heather Marquett (2016) so aptly puts it: the “women-good, men-bad argument”.

This section will explore these experiments in three parts: Section 1 will discuss experiments explicitly linking gender differences to levels of corruption through bribery games, and will explore the different scientific techniques used to establish gender differences towards risk-taking, investment and public good provision. It will also address other behavioral factors drawn from certain experimental results such as trustworthiness and honesty. Then, Section 2 will address the role of culture and the existing societal structure, particularly in the framework of matrilineal and patriarchal societies, in order to establish and reiterate that women are more risk averse, more selfless and less competitive. This shall be done through experiments comparing the relevant behavioral characteristics between women and men in the aforementioned societies.

1.2.1. Experimental analysis: determining gender differences in corruptibility

In their study on *A General Theory of Crime*, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that men are more likely to commit crimes than women. As corruption is generally established as a criminal offence, the same argument may logically be applied to gender differences in corrupt activities. Moreover, a number of field data papers found in economics literature have found that women are less tolerant towards dishonest behavior, and that women’s participation rate in politics is negatively correlated with corruption levels (Rivas, 2013: 10).

Experiments related to proving the causality between gender and corruption can be grouped into four large categories: simple bribery games, ultimatum games, dictator games, and prisoner’s dilemma games. While all four categories entail some form of bribery, these categories address in their own way the main characteristics that, until now, constitute determinants of corrupt behavior. These determinants are risk aversion, investment, and public good provision. The following paragraphs will present these different types of experiments, and explain how they each contribute to scientifically determining that women are less corrupt than men, through their attitudes towards risk aversion, investment and public good provision.
1.2.1.1. Gender differences in establishing probabilities of corruption

Experiments involving bribery activities are one of the most recurring techniques used to prove the causality between gender and corruption. Such experiments mostly entail placing women and men in different scenarios: in a first instance, participants of both sexes are identified as either senders or receivers of a payoff. Senders must determine the amount they wish to transfer to the receiver. The receiver must then decide on how that same amount is allocated – to benefit themselves, or to benefit others.

Schulze and Frank (2000) are among the first to have generated empirical evidence on women’s attitudes towards corruption. In their experiment, involving a large group of both female and male students, subjects are presented with a problem affecting the whole group, and ten different “solutions” to this problem. Each “solution” varies between the monetary benefit directly received by the individual and that experienced by the whole group (Schulze and Frank, 2000: 12). The experiment itself is conducted according to two treatments: one is monitored (risk situation), and the other is not (non-risk situation). The results relevant to gender posit that in monitored experiments, women exhibit a significantly lower willingness to accept bribes than their male counterparts (Schulze and Frank, 2000: 16). Though the researchers do not explicitly argue that women are less corrupt, their results build on the – debated – assumption that women’s lower inclination to accept bribes simply reflects upon their greater sense loyalty and cooperation. It also contributes to the higher level of risk aversion experienced by women as opposed to men, a determinant discussed further below.

To date, Rivas (2013) provides the most useful and comprehensive scientific study; it builds on a bribery experiment between firms and public officials in order to capture the gendered characteristics of corrupt behavior. It focuses on the manipulation of a public official’s decisions through the use of a bribe. In the experiment, participants took one of two roles: that of a firm or that of a public official. The first player (the firm) could send some amount of money as a bribe to the second player (the public official) in the hope of persuading the official to take a decision favorable to the firm (name choice B in the experiment), thus creating the opportunity for corruption. This choice, however, would have negative externalities for all the other participants in the experiment (Rivas, 2013: 34). The different treatments applied to the experiment make Rivas’ (2013) study particularly unique. For each round, Rivas (2013) tests exchanges between an all-female firm and public official, an all-male firm and public official, a female firm and male public official and a male firm and female public official. In this way, Rivas (2013) can effectively examine gendered decision choices.

Rivas’ (2013) results are twofold: firstly, women choose to offer a bribe less frequently than men; as depicted in Figure 1 below, the percentage of men that decide to offer a bribe at least once is 80%, while the percentage of women is 65%. Even when women do choose to offer a bribe, female firms, on average, offer a lower transfer (3.61 tokens to male POs and 3.11 tokens to female POs) than male firms (5.96 tokens and 4.43, respectively). Secondly, the frequencies of acceptance of the bribe and of B choices are lowest when both the firm and the public official are female (49% and 28%, respectively) – in turn, the highest frequency of B choices is observed when only men are playing (78%).
Rivas (2013) also assembles the probabilities of each participant to choose the corrupt options, outlined in Figure 2 below. Note here that men assign a higher probability to a public official accepting the bribe (81%) and choosing the corrupt alternative B (60%) than women (68% and 36% respectively). Thus, male and female firms expect female public officials to choose the corrupt alternative less frequently than male officials. In addition, in the case of a female public official, the probability of accepting a bribe is lowest when dealing with a female firm.

All in all, Rivas’ (2013) results point to the argument that women are less corrupt, or at least less corruptible, than their male counterparts. This divergence in female behavior towards corruption could be explained by the perception that women may be more relationship-oriented, may have higher standards of ethical behavior.

Lambsdorff and Frank (2011) also use simple bribery games as an experiment to shed light on gender differences between fairness and reciprocity. In their experiment, involving the distribution of a bribe from a businessperson to a public servant and the consequential reciprocity of service delivery (or not), the results were twofold. On one hand, women preferred to abstain from delivery more often than men. On the other hand, men appeared more willing to engage in positive reciprocity towards the briber upon accepting the payoff (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2011: 122). All in all, Lambsdorff and Frank’s (2011) experiment shows that women exhibit a stronger concern for equality than men, whom have a stronger sense for reciprocity, even if this reciprocity is linked to corruption.
These simple bribery exercises effectively depict women as the fairer sex through their portrayal as less likely to engage in corrupt activities than men. According to Schulze and Frank (2000: 11), “corruption in real life is characterized by the prevalence of the risk of detection and punishment”. Thus, given the results of such experiments, the decision of whether or not to engage in corrupt activities depends upon an individual’s genuine cooperation and honesty, or their aversion to risk.

1.2.1.2. Using Ultimatum games, Dictator games and Prisoner’s Dilemma games

Alongside these simple bribery games, lab experiments have also included ultimatum games, dictator games and prisoner’s dilemma games, which look further into gender differences in accepting bribes. The data resulting from these games help to establish different behavior traits between men and women regarding corruption: levels of risk aversion, inequality aversion, and cooperation. Determining the differences in these characteristics between genders marks an important step in the construction of women as the fairer sex.

1.2.1.2.1. Women are more risk-averse and honest than men: the use of ultimatum games

In their review of experimental analyses of the relationship between gender and corruption, Croson and Gneezy (2009: 8) define ultimatum games as the following:

In the ultimatum game, two players are allocated a sum of money (the pie) that can be divided between them. The proposer makes an offer to the responder of how the money will be divided, which the responder accepts or rejects. If the offer is accepted, each party receives the amount that the proposer suggested. If the offer is rejected, each party receives zero.

Ultimatum games are useful in determining gender elements pertaining to levels of inequality-aversion, risk-aversion and altruism; that is, behavioral elements based on a general preference for fairness, and a general disposition to reduce elements of uncertainty in situations that could have adverse effects on all parties concerned.

In an ultimatum field experiment testing the social preferences of women versus those of men, Guth et al. (2007) asked readers of a weekly news magazine to propose (and respond to) offers in a three-party ultimatum game. In this game, the proposer makes an offer to split a pie between himself, the responder (who can accept or reject as usual), and a dummy player who has no decision authority. They find that female participants are significantly more likely to propose a three-way equal split than men. The authors then conclude suggesting that this push for equal division is due to altruism or inequality aversion, meaning that women are generally selfless.

Dreber et al. (2010) and by Charness and Gneezy (2010) conducted ultimatum game experiments directly testing for risk aversion, meaning the tendency to reduce risk in uncertain situations. Dreber et al. (2010) set up each participant with $250, to invest as they pleased. Their results showed that, on average, male participants invested 79.5% of the endowment and kept the rest of the endowment, whereas female participants only invested 48%. These results contribute to the construction that females are substantially more financially risk-averse than men. In this particular uncertain situation, women would therefore aim to reduce risk by avoiding engaging with corruption schemes that could potentially backfire on their investment.
Charness and Gneezy (2010) reinforce this position; they also find strong gender differences in investment behavior. In controlling for ambiguity aversion, this particular experiment involved deciding whether to invest a sum (an amount decided by the participant) in a risky asset. Once again, the researchers noted a strong difference in investment behavior between male and female participants: in all different comparisons, men invested more than women across the board.

Dreber and Johannesson (2008), although not focused on whether or not women are more risk-averse than men, use a form of ultimatum game to put forward the notion that women are more honest than men. While risk-aversion is not explicitly linked to honesty, it is still relevant to essentially differentiate male and female attitudes linking to corruption. These authors use a sender and receiver game in which the sender has the monetary incentive to send a deceptive message to their receiver; this methodology is largely based on other experiments that have proven that anonymous pre-experiment communication augments cooperation in social dilemmas and improves bargaining efficiency. Dreber and Johannesson (2008) reason that certain individuals have developed an aversion towards lying, which generates an emotional cost to the liar.

The authors' aim is to test whether or not gender differences exist in this type of experiment, specifically concerning lying and trusting behavior. In order to do so, they modelled a game using Swedish Krona (SEK) in which two individuals in different rooms are paired anonymously – one acts as the sender and the other the receiver. The receiver must choose between two actions, A and B, which are associated with different real monetary payments to the individuals. In scenario A, the sender earns SEK 40 and the receiver earns SEK 50; whereas in scenario B, the monetary gain is inversed with the sender earning SEK 50 and the receiver SEK 40. The study was carried out on a total of 312 undergraduate students at Stockholm University (i.e. with 156 senders and 156 receivers).

The receiver must choose between these two actions without knowledge of the amount of the payoffs. Before the receiver decides, however, the sender communicates with the receiver to inform them of the monetary payoffs of the action. The twist is that the sender can be honest by sending the message that “Option A will earn you more money than action B” or this person can lie by messaging the receiver with the false information that “Option B will earn you more money than action A”.

The results revealed that men are more likely than women to lie in order to secure a monetary benefit, as demonstrated in Figure 3 below (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008: 198).
A total of 85 male participants were senders and 55% of these lied to the receiver in order to secure a higher payoff, in contrast to 38% of the 71 female senders. This statistic portrays women as intrinsically more honest than men as a whole, thus echoing the body of literature already designating women as the fairer sex. Given this conclusion, women are less likely to commit corruption due to the inherent dishonesty of such an act, in contrast to their honest personality.

Eckel and Grossman (2001) also build essentialist notions with regards to women; they open their article on gender differences in chivalry and solidarity with a quote by Ken Arrow:

> Economics has done very badly [explaining] large differences among [...] gender differences. Some of this can be due to individual differences, but some of them clearly must be social" (Arrow cited in Eckel and Grossman, 2001: 171).

These two authors have also investigated chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games to put forward two essentialist arguments: on the one hand, that women are more generous than men and, on the other hand, that women generally demonstrate more solidarity than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2001).

They come to this conclusion through the use of ultimatum game experiments, specifically designed to test for differences in the behavior of men and women and to answer the questions: “Does the strategy adopted or the offer made or accepted differ systematically by the sex of the decision-maker?” and “Does the sex of the opponent influence a player’s strategy choice?” In this particular bargaining game, two players split a fixed amount of money according to specific rules detailed in the previous section. There are two stages in the game conducted by Eckel and Grossman (2001); the first, dubbed the proposer stage, lends itself to strategy: the subjects’ payoffs are interdependent and an unequal proposal carries the risk of rejection; the second, the accept-or-reject phase, is nonstrategic and void of risk. The game repeats eight times, in each repetition, the participants are matched with a different partner; each participant plays the two different roles four times.
Eckel and Grossman (2001) present three hypotheses regarding respondents: firstly, women, being 'naturally' more cooperative, are more likely to accept unequal offers than men; secondly, individuals feel a degree of solidarity when dealing with a partner of the same sex (also known as gender empathy); thirdly, men are more accepting of offers when playing with a woman due to their chivalrous nature. As for the hypotheses for proposers: firstly, men are more likely to offer less equal - or fair - divisions than women; second, chivalrous men are more generous in their proposals when playing with a woman; and the third is identical to the last respondent hypothesis (Ibid). The results in Figure 4 below do indeed highlight a tendency for women to cooperate, as opposed to competing, as well as the strong solidarity that exists between women in the game and the dominance of chivalry when men are faced with a female proposer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposals By</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mean Amount Offered</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>% Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All subjects</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1.875</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1.825</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to men</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.828</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to women</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.828</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to mixed group</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.820</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1.924</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to men</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.992</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to women</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to mixed group</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPI</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1.768</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSU</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1.982</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.110</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonblacks</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1.793</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures are rejection rates for offers to black and nonblack subjects.

**Figure 4:** Summary Data Proposals and Rejection Rates

Thus, when applying these conclusions to corruption, we can deduce that women, by virtue of being more generous, would not partake in a corrupt act due to the selfishness of said action. Furthermore, the solidarity demonstrated by women could also be applied in an aversion to corruption context as partaking in corruption is a decidedly unilateral and antisocial decision, reiterating the notion of women as the fairer sex.

These studies all contribute in their own manner to the idea that women are more financially risk-averse than men. Given the empirical evidence arguing that they are more careful with their investments and the ways in which they handle monetary gains, women are thus logically less likely to engage in corruption schemes.

1.2.1.2.2. Women are less selfish than men: the use of Dictator games

Forsythe et al. (1994) provides a basic definition planning a dictator game: the proposer has a sum of money to share between themselves and the recipient. In this experimental scenario, however, the recipient has no decision to make, as opposed to ultimatum games: they can only accept the offer. Thus, the experiment focuses explicitly on the proposer's behavior and decisions, which helps to determine elements of inequality aversion or altruism.
financial strategy or risk-related concerns are not relevant here (Croson and Gneezy, 2009: 10).

One of the first studies incorporating gender within a dictator game, conducted by Eckel and Grossman (1998), considers an allocation exercise whereby the ultimate test is the basic divergence in male and female levels of selfishness. Participants must determine the division of a $10 transfer between themselves and an anonymous respondent. According to the structure of the experiment, a dictator must sacrifice earnings dollar-for-dollar in order to reward their partner (Eckel and Grossman, 1998: 729). Therefore, a completely selfish dictator would keep the whole sum to him or herself, whereas a less selfish dictator would divide the amount evenly.

The results of the game overwhelmingly assert that women are more generous to their partners than men: 15% of women participating donate half of the amount to the responder, against 3.33% of men. In fact, women donate more than men in almost every donation scheme; on average, women donate roughly twice what their male counterparts donate (Eckel and Grossman, 1998: 730). From these results, we can conclude that women are more socially-oriented than men, who, in turn, are more individually-oriented: 60% of male dictators donated $0, against 47% of female dictators. If these differences were replicated on a larger scale, then women’s intrinsic dispositions to act more selflessly will guarantee a more equitable distribution of resources.

Bolton and Katok (1995) conducted a second important study involving dictator games, contrary to Eckel and Grossman (1998), they opt for a less anonymous design in which participants are again asked to divide a sum of $10. Also, a dictator cannot offer more than $5 to the responder. Despite these comparative differences with Eckel and Grossman’s (1998) experiment, the researchers again find that female dictators are more giving than their male counterparts, though the difference is not as statistically significant as that found in Eckel and Grossman (1998). On average, women gave $1.23 compared to men, who gave $1.13 (Bolton and Katok, 1995: 291). The context-sensitivity that women experience due to the lack of anonymity could explain this difference. Yet, these findings still verify that women are more spontaneously generous than men.

Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) further explain women’s aversion to inequality. They find that women are more concerned with sharing earnings equally between parties, as opposed to men who are more concerned by maximizing efficiency and self-gain. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006), through their team-dictator game experiments involving the division of money between groups of three and a fourth recipient, also find that female-majority groups give the fourth party significantly more than male-majority groups. As a result, they are more likely to implement equal splits between participants. This echoes Guth et al.’s (2007) findings and again supports the notion that women are more inequality-averse than men.

The key difference between ultimatum games and dictator games is that, contrary to the former, the latter does not involve bribes per se. Though both structures share similarities, the direct and forceful imposition of what may be called a “donation” to the respondent reflects the dictator’s inequality aversion much more significantly than an ultimatum game could. However, that is not to say that the combination of ultimatum and dictator games work in opposition - quite the contrary. By scientifically demonstrating how women are both more risk-averse and inequality-averse, both games contribute to their natural identification as more generous and more careful with their financial investments. Therefore, both types of games play a crucial role in defining women as the fairer sex.
1.2.1.2.3. Women are more cooperative than men: the use of Prisoner’s Dilemma games

Another important gender determinant regarding corruption is the difference between men and women when addressing public good provision. Certain schemes could significantly affect public goods and their distribution to the wider public through taking advantage of the public system; this could be deemed as corruption. According to Nowell and Tinkler (1994: 25), “free riding in public goods experiments leads to significant underinvestment in the public good”. In investigating gender differences in public good provision, relevant studies are conducted using prisoner’s dilemma games.

Several experiments have concluded that, when it comes to public good provision, women are more cooperative in terms of social justice than men (Sibley et al., 1968; Tedeschi et al., 1969; Meux, 1973; Frank et al., 1993; Ortmann and Tichy, 1996). In particular, Eagly (1986) finds that, when placed in situations whereby the participants must allocate financial investment, men seem to take more for themselves than women. Similarly, Gilligan (1982) argues that women will more likely base their public good provision schemes on morality, which they equate with the non-infringement upon others. Combined, these studies strongly suggest that, when presented with an opportunity to provide goods, women would allocate more fairly than men, due to their stronger disposition to cooperate with social norms and justice.

The study of how men and women make provision choices is central to Nowell and Tinkler’s experiment (1993), in which group members could observe each other’s choice of allocation over a series of 13 repeated allocation sequences, to see if this repetition activated gender differences in behavior. Each experiment received an endowment of 62 tokens the beginning of each sequence, to be divided between a private and a public good (good A and B, respectively). Investing in good A paid $0.01 to the groups for every token invested, whereas investing in good B returned $0.012 for every token invested (Nowell and Tinkler, 1993: 28).

The study’s results first show that, on average, the contribution to the public good of all individuals who participated in the experiment was 26.9 tokens. Secondly, on average, all-female groups made higher contributions to the public good than all-male or mixed-gender groups. This result remained consistent over time: between the testing allocation levels during the first and last 3 test sequences, all-male groups’ contribution declined by 60%, whereas the rates of all-female groups’ contributions declined by 43%. The researchers attribute this decline to the level of free-riding that expectedly increased throughout the experiment (Nowell and Tinkler, 1993: 29-30). Therefore, the ultimate contribution of public goods by all-female groups is likely to be greater than that of all-male groups. The importance of public good provision in determining women as the fairer sex is discussed further below, framed within particular cultural contexts. Thus, men are found to be consistently less cooperative than women, which contributes to the construction of women as less corruptible than men.

All in all, women are more risk averse, meaning they are less ambitious when dealing with financial schemes and payoffs; they are more inequality averse, meaning they strive to contribute to distributing payoffs in a more equitable manner, incurring benefits for a wider portion of those affected; and they are generally more cooperative in contributing to the provision of necessary goods to the wider public. Though these character traits are not always specifically linked to levels of corruption within the experiments detailed previously, they still all negatively affect the level of corruptibility experienced by women. Therefore, the
justified characterization of the female sex as being more cautious, more generous and more supportive of the public good inherently constructs women as the fairer sex.

1.2.2. The place of culture in the construction of the fairer sex

As concluded above with different experiments and their analysis, women are painted as more risk averse, more selfless, more socially orientated and with less competitively inclined than men. Many discussions center on whether these gender differences are due to nature or nurture. Therefore, this section will look at how culture and society plays a role in shaping the above characteristics. It will analyze whether the above hold true when it comes to matrilineal societies, where women are the head of the households, or whether it changes altogether.

Before moving forward, the basic definition of the matrilineal and patriarchal societies needs to be looked at. In the former, the ancestral descent is traced from the mother’s family and children born in these households remain in it. The Khasi girls of India spend their whole lives (matrilocal) in the same household and, as heads of households, they enjoy significant authority over important decisions (matriline). While it does not bestow all decision-making power onto them, they get more of a say in these decisions than in other societies. In addition, they do not take up traditional male roles, such as a warriors or hunter, and men still unilaterally participate the discourse on politics, civil justice or defense. Mostly, men are duolocal, which means they can either stay at their wife’s home or their mother/sister’s. Generally, they are given much more importance at the latter's house than the former. Nevertheless, after the death of the mother, the entire household property is passed on to the daughters of the family. While in the patriarchal societies, men are given authority over women in all aspects of their lives. One needs to keep in mind, however, the basic differences that exist between the two types of society in diverse regions of the world. We will address these differences as needed, notably in the context of the experiments.

The following section focuses on three experiments with participants belonging to both matrilineal and patriarchal societies regarding the provision of public goods, risk attitudes and the differences in competition [the bases of which were discussed previously]. These experiments provide a clearer picture to determine and conclude the importance of society in proving the aforementioned gender differences and characteristics.

1.2.2.1. Provision of public good between Khasi and Assamese communities - Andersen et al. (2008)

Andersen et al. (2008) conducted the following experiment in three Indian societies with respondents from two patriarchal societies and one matrilineal society. The former two were Muslim and Hindu Assamese villages while the latter was a Christian Meghalaya village. The participants were first paired up in groups randomly and given some rupees and asked to invest either in individual exchanges or group exchanges. The positive and negative framing of these exchanges provided the base of the design of the trial where,

In the positive framing, subjects are told, every Rupee you invest in the Individual Exchange will yield you a return of one. Every Rupee invested in the Group Exchange will yield a return of one half for every member of the group, not just the person who invested it.” In the negative framing, subjects are told, “Every Rupee you invest in the Individual Exchange will yield you a return of one. However, each Rupee you invest in the Individual Exchange
will reduce the earnings of the other players by one-half Rupee each (Andersen et al, 2008: 378).

Hence, someone with a higher tenacity for selfishness would simply invest in the individual exchange.

After conducting the experiment with 191 subjects, Anderson et al. (2008) concluded that 73% of Khasi people are less likely than the Assamese Muslim to be strong free riders. Hence, in the case of the matrilineal societies, there are fewer people who are free riders and the provision of public good being much higher in comparison to the non-matrilineal societies. While finally, the higher percentage of public goods is due to men rather women from these societies. A plausible explanation for this could be that that as men in these societies cannot accumulate wealth for their themselves, it forces them to contribute much more to the public good than their self-interest. Also, note that while Khasi females contributed more than Assamese Muslim females, Assamese Hindu women contributed more than Khasi females.

Still, in the case of non-matrilineal societies, framing too mattered as strong free-riding was greater in the negatively framed treatment among the Assamese groups, but not in the Khasi groups. Moreover, the scholars were perplexed with the influence of religion on the game as they did not account for it originally. Yet, religion was strongly correlated to individual participation. Further research has been done on both the role of tradition and religion in the succeeding section of the paper. The above mentioned results were also in line with Andreoni (1995) who had similar findings.

1.2.2.2. Risk Attitudes between Yi and Mosuo communities - Gong and Yang (2011)

Gong and Yang (2011) conducted an experiment on two ethnic groups in China: The Yi (a patriarchal society) and the Mosuo (a matrilineal society). The latter is an agrarian society where they practice walking marriages as men only visit the household at night. The children from these marriages stay with the mother’s family and are raised without their father. Additionally, the spouses have no economic obligation towards each other. Yi, on the other hand, practice the traditional patriarchal model where women do not inherit any property and men make the important decisions of the household. In general, the Mosuo are known to have bigger or larger families.

For the experiment, the chosen subjects had the same average age and in both societies, women are the ones with lower education levels. Nonetheless, the Yi women have the least education. The trial had two parts – Investment Risk (IR) and Compound Risk (CR). Gong and Yang (2011) replicate Gneezy & Potters’ (1997) experiment design. In the first IR portion, each subject receives 10RMB to invest in a lottery which either yields three times the original amount or nothing with a 50-50 chance. After which, the subject draws one card from the total of six cards (three red and three black) and if they choose a red card, they win, a black card, they lose. While, in the CR portion, the subject has to choose one card from 10 piles of cards where each pile has all four suits. The subject has two choices, they can either gamble, as with the first part of the experiment, and earn 2RMB for each diamond card drawn or play against the experimenter. If they draw the highest diamond card between the two, they will receive 6RMB for each diamond card drawn.

The card game provided the following results: in the case of IR, matrilineal men belonging to the Mosuo community invested all or most of their income in the gamble (54% on average),
while the Mosuo women and Yi men invested 32% and 37% respectively; Yi women, however, did not invest nearly as much, only 4.3% Gong and Yang (2011). The inference one can draw from the above is simple, in both cases, men are less risk-averse irrespective of the society they come from. Conversely, as Mosuo men do not take any economic responsibility, they too appear less risk averse. Yi women, however, are extremely risk averse as they do not gamble at all in CR nor IR. Furthermore, the Mosuo group as a whole is much less risk averse than the Yi group. The larger family size in the Mosuo society could explain this; with a bigger family, one may be more willing to take risks due to the safety net provided by the family. Education too has an influence on the outcome, as more educated people may be less risk averse due to a stable income.

Gong and Yang’s (2011) experiment demonstrates that cultural factors like family size, being head of the family, education, income and age do have significant influence on risk attitude. Among the Mosuo, the gender gap is significantly smaller in comparison to the Yi; thus, one can infer that nurture does affect gender differences in risk preferences to certain extent (Gong & Yang, 2011). This is consistent and in line with the outcomes of Cárdenas et al. (2012) and Harrison & Rutstrom (2008).

1.2.2.3. Differences in Competition between Khasi and Maasai communities - Gneezy et al. (2006)

Gneezy, Leonard & List (2006) piloted an experiment with the Maasai community in Tanzania (a patriarchal society) and the Khasi community in India (a matrilineal society).

The experiment involved 155 individuals (52 Khasi women, 28 Khasi men, 34 Maasai women, and 40 Maasai men), who were randomly divided into groups of two and explained their task of throwing tennis balls into a bucket placed three meters away in 10 chances. Participants were also told that they had been anonymously paired up and that they had two options to receive their participation fee. The first option gave 500 Tanzanian shillings or 20 Indian rupees for each successful shot in the bucket or thrice the amount if an individual scores more than their teammate. If both team members score the same amount of shots, however, they would receive the original amount. Additionally, the participants had to choose the incentive scheme before beginning.

The results were interesting. Only 39% of the Maasai decided to compete while half of the Khasi subjects chose otherwise. In terms of gender, only 26% Maasai women competed compared to 50% Maasai men. Whereas, 54% of Khasi women and only 39% Khasi men chose the competition route. Thus, the Khasi women were a bit more competitive than the Maasai men. Furthermore, women in the Maasai communities are 25-32% less likely to compete if one restrains age, income, work activities, marital status, relationship to the household and education level. On the other hand, when controlling for the above factors, Khasi women are 15% more likely to compete than men. (Gneezy et al. 2006). Thus, it cannot be universally acknowledged that women shy away from competition more than men. In the case of matrilineal societies where women have the means and the capabilities to amass wealth and an opportunity to reward their competitiveness, they are likely to be more competitive. This suggests that culture might be a defining factor in addressing the willingness of men and women to compete.

Nonetheless, the fact that Khasi women have different preferences than other women does not prove that their behavior is not genetically determined. It is possible that some features
of their environment caused the Khasi to follow a different evolutionary path and, therefore, to have different psychological profiles from other women.

Keeping in mind the above experiments and their inferences, one can conclude that gender differences are result of both cultural factors and nurture. Alatas et al. (2009) has reinforced this idea through their study of cultural impacts on gender differences in the context of economic transactions in different countries (Australia, India, Singapore and Indonesia). With their research, the authors conclude that gender differences are not universal, but rather cultural. In this sense, gender differences with regards to corruption retain an important cultural component that is important to address when conducting such research.

Cultural factors are also the reason why women are encouraged to participate in policy making as well in political and economic institutions. With regards to corruption, women in more patriarchal societies have a skewed perspective on social issues due to their general lack of knowledge and influence by the men’s views. In such societies, one would expect to see less of a gender difference in behavior toward corruption in comparison with societies where women feel more comfortable in voicing their own opinions (Gneezy et al, 2006).

1.3. Early conjectures

To sum up the results found in our primary axes of research, we find that a substantial body of literature has dedicated itself to justifying the inherent belief that women are the fairer sex. On one hand, Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) present a range of scientific data that aims to prove that women are inherently less corrupt than men. The founding papers focus on testing through regression models the relationship between corruption in the public sector and women’s share of labor force and participation at high levels of the government. The findings from the cross-country tests are statistically robust, despite several methodological critiques to their work - note that, although certain cultures reinforce these notions as shown by the analysis above, it is problematic to generalize the same for diverse regions of the world.

On the other hand, results found in scientific experiments conducted by researchers inspired by Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) each contribute in their own way to this central position advocating that women are inherently less corrupt, and less corruptible, than men. This overall behavioral analysis is extremely effective in building the arguments necessary in using women as a durable and valuable anti-corruption measure in public systems.
2. Alternative explanations

Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) would have us believe that the sex of an individual determines their propensity for corruption. Their essentialist argument builds upon the stereotypical idea of women as the caretaker and nurturer to explain their aversion to corruption. In her article on “bad science” discussing the use of cultural values in sciences, Longino (1983) reminds us that “the social and cultural stakes of the outcomes of such research can themselves affect the norms and constraints governing it” (Longino, 1983: 16). Keeping this in mind then, it follows that the stereotypical social role of women as mothers cannot explain their political behavior as

Women of different classes, ethnic groups, and places engage in political activity for reasons that span the gap between the altruistic and the selfish. Women are as likely to be ambitious and competitive as they are caring and socially responsible (Rokowski, 2003: 181, in Sung, 2012: 214).

Thus, there must be alternative factors that explain the correlation seen in Dollar et. al (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001).

This section will discuss the author's claiming the relationship between gender and corruption is spurious. Rather than the sex of the politician, the instance of corruption depends upon the institutional (both formal and informal) context: regime type, political culture and the existing representation and accountability mechanisms.

2.1. A fairer system: democracy vs autocracy

Two years after the publication of the founding articles, Sung (2003) publishes a critique of Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) claiming that the negative relationship between gender and corruption is in fact spurious. Sung (2003) claims that the difference between instances in corruption are due to differences in regime type rather than the sex of the politician. A consolidated liberal democracy (or constitutional liberalism) promotes gender equality, encourages good governance, and provides measures against corruption. Thus, women are not the “fairer sex,” but rather liberal democracy provides a “fairer system” which discourages corruption and enables women to hold political positions.

Agerberg (2014) finds that:

While the share of elected women should have little or no impact on the levels of corruption in contexts of corrupt equilibria, in a setting where good governance is the state's operative norm, increasing women's political representation could have potential to curb corruption (Agerberg, 2014: 16).

Yet, the mediating factor, in this argument, remains the type of regime. Thus, the relationship seen between sex and corruption may be conditioned upon factors such as whether a country is democratic or not.

The “fairer system” argument states that the institutions in a democracy simultaneously create the conditions for higher representation of women and lower corruption. Thus, “both female participation in government, and lower levels of corruption are dependent on a liberal democratic polity” (Sung, 2003: 707). Sung (2012) further tests the “fairer system” theory against the “fairer sex” argument and finds that the level of women in government (nor its increase) has an impact on corruption, but the strength of liberal institutions (and its increase) “predict the prevalence and trend of corruption” (Sung, 2012: 195).
A liberal democracy also matters for female participation because the “structure of a political system can encourage or prevent women’s entry to that very system” (Sung, 2003: 707). Thus, in a democratic system, women will have greater opportunity to access the political system through institutional, non-corrupt means. In fact, in opposition to an autocratic system, their only possible entry into the political system requires winning an election rather than depending on clientelistic networks (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013). A democratic system, and notably its political culture is built upon the “liberal tradition of fairness, pluralism, and tolerance that facilitates the entry and permanence of women in key political positions” (Sung, 2003: 707). These values, as we will see in the discussion below, play a key role not only in granting women equal opportunity to participate in the political system, but also as anti-corruption measures. The following section will also delve deeper into the issue of opportunity for women to partake in corruption once in the political system.

Autocracies, on the other hand, favor the creation of clientelistic networks and corruption due to the way in which politicians enter the political system. Whereas in a democracy, individuals must appeal to their constituency to win an election by a majority, in autocracies much participation in government (including female participation) is imposed from above via appointment, which could socialize appointees into existing networks of corruption (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 386).

Furthermore, the deepening of democracy (via improved rule of law, consolidation of democratic institutions, and strengthening liberal and democratic institutions) correlates with lower levels of corruption and improvements in greater control of corruption (Sung, 2012: 212-213). The strength of democratic institutions depends not only upon their design but also upon the political culture in which they operate.

2.2. Political culture & corruption

While inextricably linked to the type of regime, political culture is external to institutional design. It denotes the substantive aspects, such as behaviors, attitudes, and norms in relation to a regime. The political culture within a country or culture has a direct impact on how it perceives, engages with, and punishes corruption.

2.2.1. Democratic political culture’s positive impact on corruption

Given the political and social context of a country, the relationship between gender and corruption may change. For instance, Esarey and Chirillo (2013), expect “increasing women’s participation in government to have uneven effects on corruption that vary widely across political and social contexts” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 362). This is due to “an interaction effect that emphasizes institutions as a mediating factor,” which includes institutions as frameworks and as “logics” or informal rules that determine appropriateness of actions (Stensöta, 2015: 481).

Thus, not only does the type of regime matters for instances of corruption, but also the quality of regime matters. Sung (2003; 2012) specifies constitutional liberalism as the explanation for the correlation rather than democracy in general. That is to say, a mere electoral democracy may be insufficient to fulfill the role of promoting gender equality and enforcing anti-corruption measures. Rather a democratic political culture must also be
present. To understand a regime’s impact on corruption it is necessary to look at the social and cultural values that go along with those institutions.

Stensöta (2015) explains that:

“regime type plays a role because such norms exist in democracies, but not in autocracies. As democracies have a norm against corruption, this would account for the gender difference in corruption in democracies. Hence, the absence of a difference in autocracies is explained by the absence of a norm condemning corruption” (Stensöta, 2015: 478).

Thus, we would expect to find less corruption in countries where corruption is not considered the norm and where it is more harshly punished (i.e. where a democratic political culture exists).

The difference in political culture between democracies and autocracies also offers an explanation for the gender gap seen at different levels of corruption in these societies. Esarey and Chirillo (2013) note that “women are less susceptible to corruption in democracies but equally susceptible in autocratic systems” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 362). In an autocracy where corruption is considered the norm, or considered necessary to attain access to public goods, women - just as men - will have a higher propensity for corruption. A liberal democracy with norms against corruption and a legal framework to punish it in place, however, will generally have lower levels of corruption overall. Yet, in democracies, we also tend to see a gender gap where women perceive greater levels of corruption while playing a smaller part in corrupt activities. The following two sections will cover the most common explanations for the gender gap seen in corruption that offer an alternative to the “fairer sex” discourse.

2.2.2. Women’s limited opportunities

Opportunity of corruption is very linked with the political culture as it is a question of access to political leadership. We saw above how a political culture provides opportunities to access the political system. This section will analyze once women have entered the political system, how political culture determines the opportunities women have to partake in corruption.

Anne-Marie Goetz explains the issue of access to political leadership for women well in her article when she says that:

*We need to understand the ways parties selectively recruit and socialize women to politics, whether political competition requires the use of ‘muscle’ and the generation of huge sums of money for campaigns, and whether parties offer women and men different opportunities for illicit or illegal activities* (Goetz, 2007: 96).

Indeed, she takes the example of South Asia political parties and explains that most women access political functions because of their “relationship as daughters or widows to powerful men who have been deposed or assassinated, reflects the ineptitude of the region’s political parties” (Goetz, 2007: 96). That means that those women enter in political parties through their personal connections lacking “experience of political alliance building, debate, long-term strategizing, campaign resource generation, and policy development” (Goetz, 2007: 98). Consequently, those women lack of “secure constituency base”, and it can “encourage undemocratic and possibly also corrupt leadership practices” (Goetz, 2007: 98) She concludes that “the ways [in which] women are recruited (or not) to the leadership and rank-and-file of political parties restrict their opportunities for engaging in corrupt activities”
Thus, rather than the “fairer sex,” women merely lack to opportunity to participate in corruption due to their lack of experience in the political arena.

Most of the time, women “are excluded from the relevant social and political networks through, which corruption flows” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 362). As these are historically male-dominated networks, women usually will not have access, “at least not when they are newcomers to positions of power in political, social or economic institutions” (Hossain, Musembi, and Huges, 2010: 24). These clientelistic “old-boys’ networks” are frequently closed to women. For example, Stockemer (2011: 697) highlights that “political seats are bought and public officials are elected based on often male-dominated clientelistic networks, giving few chances to women to penetrate these networks.” In addition, women generally lack to funds to buy their way into these political networks.

Corruption requires trust and secrecy and the old-boys’ networks do not easily welcome new female colleagues. Many authors note, however, that it may only be a matter of time:

> If women do exhibit less corrupt reactions than men to opportunities for illicit earnings, that may simply be a sign of their freshness in office, lack of familiarity with ways of subverting the rules, and an understandable eagerness to prove themselves worthy of public office — effects that can wear off with time (Goetz, 2007: 99).

It is not always straightforward to adapt to illegal practices. Anne-Marie Goetz confirmed this perspective in an interview, saying “I would expect a dramatic initial drop and perhaps a slow rise over time as some women get the hang of it.” (2016). In an interview with Celestine Nyamu Musembi, she specified that this is not linked to the women specifically, but would be the same with any outsiders. “Any disruption on account of entry of a critical mass of outsiders to established networks would have the same effect” (2016). Thus, while women are currently the minority in the political area, their relationship with corruption could change as they gain more experience and larger in mass. Esarey and Chirillo (2013: 336) hypothesize that the relationship seen between women and corruption in government would fade "as women became more firmly integrated into insider political networks."

Thus, the idea that women could act as "political cleaners" to rid government of corruption, may prove true in the short term while they lack experience and means to enter into political networks. Nonetheless, their lack of know-how and skills to participate in corruption will diminish over time. When that occurs, women, just as men, will be susceptible to corrupt activity.

### 2.2.3. Corruption’s greater risk for women

Another argument that explains why women are less corrupt for other reason than their biological specificity, is the fact that they face greater risk when they engage in corruption. This argument differs from that of risk-aversion explained in part one.

Corruption presents a greater risk for women due to gender discrimination, which “makes violating institutional norms a riskier proposition for women than men” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 382). Thus, not conforming with the “fairer sex” stereotype will produce a stronger backlash against women. For a woman, partaking in corruption is riskier because she will be more harshly punished than her male counterparts if caught. Therefore, women wager higher bets than men even when engaging at the same level of corruption. Their harsher punishment is due to social expectations; the electoral system renders this particular visible.
Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2016: 2) explain that “voters hold female elected officials to a higher standard than men” and thus will judge unacceptable such a behavior coming from a woman. Thus, as women have more to lose than men when participating in a corrupt transaction, they will rationally be less willing to do so.

Participating in a corrupt transaction is taking a risk, especially in a democratic system. The risk related to corruption does not affect men and women in the same way, however, as “women are differentially impacted by these risks and thus feel greater pressure to conform to existing political norms about corruption.” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 362). This impact is differentiated because even in democratic societies, women face discrimination due to their sex, and will have more to prove than men, whatever their situation is. Hence, they are pushed to stick to their society’s rules and “are more sensitive to their incentives as a consequence of their more precarious position in government” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013: 384).

Echazu (2010) further explains how this more precarious position in government masks “fairer” behavior: women partake in corruption less frequently than men because they represent a minority in positions of power. As a minority, corruption presents a greater risk for women and thus, they cannot afford to be corrupt. Hence due to gender empathy, increasing female participation in government would only decrease corruption in male-dominated environments. If there were a female majority, however, “increasing their proportion [in government] would further increase corruption” (Echazu, 2010: 69). Thus, the minority group, in this case women in government, behaves more honestly than the dominant group, men. Echazu posits this would be true regardless of the minority group (e.g. race, ethnicity, etc). While women are not more intrinsically moral or honest than men, “it may then be a good solution to promote gender equality in a society in order to achieve lower levels of corruption” (Echazu, 2010: 69). Nonetheless, the reduction of corruption via increasing women in government is

Related to the fact that females tend to be at a disadvantage in the labor force; which in turn results in higher costs for corruption. Ideally an egalitarian society where all groups have the same possibilities would be desirable and would reduce corruption (Echazu, 2010: 70).

This last aspect was echoed by Heather Marquette in her interview where she suggests one of the most effective ways to reduce corruption would be through the reduction of inequalities rather than filling parliaments with women.

The risk assessment of corruption contradicts the “fairer sex” argument by assuming that women are aware that gender discrimination and social expectations make engaging in corruption more dangerous for them, and thus less attractive, explaining their “fairer” behavior.

2.2.4. Strength of Bureaucratic principles

In the article “Gender and Corruption: The Mediating Power of Institutional Logics” Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson (2015) analyze data on women’s representation in government administration and legislative arena over 30 European countries and concluded that “institutional logics mediate the effect of gendered experiences on corruption” (Stensöta, 2015: 475). How do they come to this conclusion? The authors have two verified
hypotheses relating to bureaucratic institutions and principles. First, they consider that “the explanatory power of the share of women in relation to corruption will be less in the bureaucratic institution than in the electoral sphere” (Stensöta, 2015: 484). Then, they argue that “the relationship between share of women and corruption is dependent on the strength of bureaucratic principles” (Stensöta, 2015: 487), bureaucratic principles meaning “how well the organization manages to separate itself from the outside world” (Stensöta, 2015: 481).

The first hypothesis is based on the following reasoning: bureaucracy and electoral sphere are gendered in different manners, “they give varying degrees of incentive to actors to use their personal experiences, such as gender, in their strategies and everyday actions” (Stensöta, 2015: 481). More clearly, the authors explain that on one side the electoral arena is “dominated by a logic that enforces the use of gender-differentiated experiences” whereas in the bureaucracy “the formalization of human interaction will constrain the use of personal characteristics such as gender” (Stensöta, 2015: 481). As the bureaucracy uses strategies to neutralize individual experiences, Stensöta et al. (2015) expect the institution of bureaucracy “to de-gender the structurally based asymmetrical experiences”. This phenomenon, however, would only arise if the bureaucratic principles are strong:

If the organizational principles are strong, we expect actors’ strategies and actions to be absorbed by the institution, whereas if the organizational principles are weaker, actors will have space in which to maneuver, and thus, gender experiences may play a role and women may contribute to lower levels of corruption also in the bureaucracy (Stensöta, 2015: 481).

That is to say that “the relationship between more women and lower levels of bureaucracy decreases as the strength of the organizing principles in the bureaucracy increases” (Stensöta, 2015: 482). The authors therefore conclude that when bureaucratic principles are strong, the relationship between women’s representation and level of corruption is less and less plausible.

2.3. Political representation and accountability

This third section discusses political representation and accountability mechanisms and will intend to nuance what has been previously stated regarding the impact of women’s representation on corruption.

2.3.1. Representation mechanisms

This section will present a discussion of the differences between and implications of descriptive and substantive representation for corruption. It will then discuss the role of electoral quotas as an anti-corruption mechanism.

2.3.1.1. Descriptive and substantive representation

When talking about women’s representation, scholars make two main distinctions: descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers mainly to the number of women elected through institutional and electoral design. It takes into account factors of distribution between men and women, countries, contexts, and time. On the other hand, substantive representation is a relatively new perspective. It is a complex concept that intends to resolve questions and build correlations on presented obstacles, internal working
procedures, policy outcomes and levels of decrease or increase in trust on government, among other factors. (Wängnerud, 2009:52)

Randall (2011) identifies that the most use argument to increase women’s representation include its recognition as an issue of fairness and social justice that signifies women’s equal political status and capabilities. Randall (2011) also mentions notions that insist on women’s special qualities that can be brought into institutions that are either innate or acquired. However, one of the most quoted concepts behind the theorizing of women’s representation is Phillip’s (1995) theory of politics of presence, which suggests that female politicians are best equipped to represent the interests of women. The theory explains that differences between women and men in their everyday lives such as child-rearing, education, occupations, divisions of paid and unpaid labor, and exposure to violence and sexual harassment are experiences that female politicians will share at least to some extent. A core idea in this strand of research is that certain interests and concerns that arise from these shared experiences would be inadequately addressed in male-dominated politics. Wängnerud (2009: 62) attests that increased descriptive representation increases legislatures’ responsiveness to women’s policy concerns and that it enhances perceptions of legitimacy among the electorate; however, she detects that the perceived effects of substantive representation are smaller than anticipated in theory.

Inglehart and Norris (2003) present empirical evidence that the gender equality scale correlates with the number of women in parliament proving a link between descriptive and substantive representation. Nevertheless, Sawer (2002) contends that the increasing number of women in parliament is insufficient to ensure that women are actually better represented since there are many other factors that may influence women’s policy choices above their gender identity. It has also been observed that one of the most dominant forces in politics is ideology and that social characteristics such as class or ethnicity can be more decisive yet. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) provide a model that shows that a politician’s gender does influence policy decisions not because women are particularly more responsive to the needs of women than to men in their communities. Rather, it is because their own preferences are more aligned to the preferences of women that they end up serving them better (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004: 1410; 1431).

On the other hand, Young (2000) highlights the importance of feminist awareness instead of focusing on the common experiences shared by female representatives and female voters that refers to the politics of presence. Recommending instead a feminist awareness approach that concentrates on the formulation and implementation of programs explicitly aiming to change society in women-friendly directions. It does not ascribe importance to female politicians per se, but to politicians with a feminist agenda.

2.3.1.2. Electoral Quotas

Arguments for enhancing women’s political representation are determined by governments and general trust in the relationship between women’s presence and the effective representation of their interests. Belief in this correlation can consequently have relevant impacts, policy-wise via the implementation of electoral quotas and other measures that actively seek to promote women’s presence in parliaments. It has also been suspected, however, that political parties promote such measures more as a means of appeal and approval than for a consistent will to include women in power making positions. This argument echoes the distinction made above between descriptive and substantive
representation. Randall discerns that Women’s political participation discussions has often been about the “supply” of women willing and able to participate and the “demand” of traditionally male-dominated political institutions and processes. Nevertheless, there are many factors that could influence these supplies and demands, such as prejudices, cultural constraints, family roles, lack of qualification and access to financial resources. She claims that it also has to do with process of selection and finance (Randall, 2011: 8). As such, one of the most popular policies to increase women’s political representation are gender quotas, which set a minimum proportion of female candidates for parliamentary seats.

Randall (2011) identifies three main types through participation regimes: (1) the voluntarily adopted by parties – which has been the pattern of European countries since 1970. (2) the quotas imposed by legislation – which is a more recent current that is commonly seen in developing countries. (3) the systems of reservation of a share of parliamentary seats from 20-30% for women – which is more practiced in smaller numbers in countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

While gender quotas evidently raise women’s descriptive representation in politics, there are concerns, such as (Krook et al., 2009: 2) that suggest that the means and process by which women enter political representation may influence how, why and to what extend their presence affects policy outcomes. One of the main concerns is that women selected in this particular way may feel pressure or an obligation to promote certain interests and agenda, or that they will face power constraints for being perceived as lacking the necessary qualities and skills that a more meritocratic contest could have ensured. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004: 1440) provide evidence on the political process showing that the identity of a decision maker greatly influences policy decisions and public goods allocation, suggesting that direct manipulation of the identity of the policymakers can have important effects on policy and have implications beyond reservation policy. Even at the lowest level of a decentralized government, all mechanisms that affect politician’s identities (term limits, eligibility conditions, etc.) may affect policy decisions. This is important at a time in which many new decentralized institutions are being designed around the world. There seems to be a general conclusion that gender quotas cannot be regarded as a ‘quick fix’ and that there needs to be a consideration of all the political and cultural factors of the context into which it is being introduced.

The relation between the presence of quotas in the electoral system has also been observed advocating that woman’s chance of being selected as a parliamentary candidate are substantially higher under proportional representation party list systems. (Randall, 2011) Wängnerud (2009: 59) elaborates on the factors that influence the variations in the number of women elected in national parliaments, which can be divided into three main subcategories. (1) Macro-level variables that include year of female suffrage, religion, gender-equality culture, system cleanliness, electoral system, welfare state system, legal gender quotas, government (nonmilitary) expenditure, socioeconomics, and contagion effects across countries. (2) Meso-level variables such as party ideology, party organization, party gender quotas, women’s movement, timing and framing, dynamics in specific elections and contagion effects across parties. (3) Micro-level variables that include voter preferences and the levels of motivation among women to be candidates.

The containment of corruption has a positive impact on the number of women in parliament; “for every 10 percent increase in control of corruption, the number of female deputies grows by 1.6 percent… [implying] an approximately 10-point difference in female representation
between most and the least corrupt countries on the continent” (Stockemer, 2011: 703). This suggests that by tacking corruption, countries would open the political system to greater women’s representation. In addition, regardless of electoral system of the presence of quotas, combatting corruption leads to increased female representation (Stockemer, 2011).

2.3.2. Accountability mechanisms

This section presents three integral mechanisms to restrain corruption through improved accountability: good governance, electoral accountability, and the inclusion of gender in anti-corruption policies and programs.

2.3.2.1. Good governance

The UNIFEM report “Who Answers to Women? Gender & Accountability” written by Anne-Marie Goetz and others experts in 2008, perceives accountability as one of the “core element of democratic politics and good governance” (Goetz, 2008: 2). Accountability encompasses two different aspects. First, it ensures that “power-holders ‘give an account’ of what they did with the public trust and national revenue” (Goetz, 2008: 2). Secondly, if a political performance failure it to be found, then accountability imposes a “corrective action (…) through a process of ‘enforcement of remedy’”. (Goetz, 2008: 2) In the context of gender and corruption, the same report explains that

More women in politics are not the cause of low corruption, but rather, democratic and transparent politics is correlated with low corruption [...] In a society characterized by free elections, rule of law, and separation of powers, the protection of basic liberties facilitates women’s entry into government. At the same time, more competitive and transparent politics minimizes opportunities for corruption (Goetz, 2008: 27).

In other words, efficient accountability mechanisms that create good governance and transparency are one of the main explanations of low level of corruption in democratic societies.

2.3.2.2. Electoral accountability mechanism

In the vain of the UNIFEM report, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2016) in the article “Women’s Representation, Accountability, and Corruption in Democracies”, argue that the relationship between greater women’s representation in parliaments and governments and lower levels of corruption is directly linked to the level of electoral accountability. In other words, they consider that “where voters have the ability to identify corrupt official and punish them at the ballot box... a strong negative relationship exists between women’s representation and perceived corruption levels” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 2; 26). As discussed above, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2016) consider that two theoretical mechanisms (women’s representation and corruption and the risks of corruption) can clarify partly this relationship. The authors also generate four institutional mechanisms influencing the electoral accountability and test them with a “time series cross sectional dataset of 76 democratic-leaning countries” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 26).

The first hypothesis is that “Where corruption is endemic and pervasive, corruption norms develop because corruption becomes the accepted and expected way that politics is done. Corruption norms do not develop, however, where corruption is not pervasive”. (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 9). The second hypothesis relates to freedom of the press. Sung
already suggested in his paper that “the role of the judiciary and the press are of singular importance” (Sung, 2003: 718) and Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2016) go further as they consider that “a larger share of women in parliament is associated with lower levels of corruption when the press is free, but not when the press is restricted” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 22). Thirdly, the authors go back to the parliamentary governance hypothesis as they consider that “The relationship between female share of the legislature and corruption level will be more negative in parliamentary systems when compared to presidential systems”. (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 23). Finally, the last hypothesis is about personalism. The authors explain that in personalistic systems (where tighter ties exist between voters and their elected representatives and create a stronger electoral accountability) the link between women’s representation in government and corruption is stronger than in party-centric systems where “elites may be able to hide inside the party organization and deflect direct punishment at the polls” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 14).

All of these four hypotheses were verified according to the authors. What is important here, is that rather than suggesting a clear and simple link between level of representation of women and level of corruption, the article supports “a subtler relationship that runs through electoral accountability” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 28). Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer therefore urge governments to both increase gender-parity but also to implement “institutional reforms to catch and punish officials who are guilty of corruption” (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2016: 28).

2.3.2.3. Mainstreaming gender into anti-corruption policies and programs

In the UNDP report published in 2010, “Corruption, accountability and gender: understanding the connections”, public accountability mechanisms are considered as one of the key effort to make in order to “prevent corruption and redress its effects on women”. (Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, 2010: 32). The report explains that by redefining ‘public-sector accountability systems’, previous gender-biases systems will address correctly practices (corruption) that abuse women’s rights. What accountability mechanisms need to be reformed? The report details them as:

- Traditional oversight mechanisms (e.g., elections, judicial review, public audits), promotion and performance review systems within public governance structures, quasi-public review bodies (e.g., ombudspersons, human rights commissions and vigilance commissions), and market regulators (Hossain, Musembi and Hugues, 2010 2010: 32).

We need to reform accountability mechanisms to fight corruption, but these reforms must be gender-responsive.

In their interview, Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Naomi Hossain reiterate this reasoning. Celestine Nyamu Musembi in her interview does not hesitate to say that “the notion of feminizing public space as an anti-corruption measure is highly overrated and there is no merit whatsoever to the argument” (interview with Celestine Nyamu Musembi, April 2016). Illustrating her points giving Malawian and current Brazilian governments as examples, she considers that “arguments in support of women’s public participation should be based on women’s right to participate as a matter of citizenship rights, not because they have been proven to bring something to the public political sphere.” Her co-author on the UNDP report,
Naomi Hossain expressed the same idea regarding anti-corruption measures and gender during the interview:

*What I have seen in a piece of work I have been doing, about the Political economy of education reform and looking at different countries in Africa and Asia, we found that most of the teachers are women, but this is not actively considered in the policy framework and in policy reform discussion (interview with Naomi Hossain, March 2016)*

In other words, both Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Naomi Hossain think that accountability reforms and implementation of anti-corruption policies should not be about increasing women’s representation, but rather taking into account the quality of accountability institutions and how women are situated in a relationship of accountability.
3. Deconstructing the controversy: are we asking the right questions?

3.1. Measurements of Corruption

Given the secretive nature of corruption, it is extremely hard to have objective tools for measuring it, as objective data is difficult to obtain. For these reasons, indirect indicators, based primarily on perceptions, have emerged as the dominant method of measuring corruption at the national, regional and global levels. The two most prominent indices of corruption are perception based indices: The Corruption Perception Index constructed by Transparency International and World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Of these two, only the CPI focuses solely on corruption.

Below, we discuss both, along with the International Country Risk Guide. This is followed by a discussion on their criticisms, and the consequences of employing these indices to measure the relationship between gender and corruption as has been defined by the scope of this paper.

We chose to present these three indices here as they are the most used in the literature dealing with gender and corruption. We also include the Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, although it has not been utilized in the study of gender and corruption. However, since it is the only prominent index that provides disaggregated data on gender, income, age group and urban/rural residence, we believe it is important to take it into consideration in our discussion.

3.1.1. The Corruption Perception Index

The CPI came into existence in 1995; Transparency International (TI) has since published it on an annual basis. The CPI measures only public sector corruption (administrative and government) perception from the perspective of businesspeople and country experts. The information is collected indirectly by TI, using the data obtained by different institutions. A country must be covered by a minimum of three sources of information, the TI uses for the CPI to be ranked in the Index.

The CPI has seen an evolution in methodologies through the years, the most significant one being in 2012 and making the CPI rankings comparable for the years following 2012. The CPI ranks countries based on the level of perceived public sector corruption, with scores ranging from a 100 signifying the lowest level of perceived corruption, and 0 signifying the highest level of perceived corruption.

One of the main criticisms of the CPI is that there is no standardization of what is understood as corruption or as the degree of corruption (Thompson & Shah, 2013). TI itself has an extremely broad definition of corruption: “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Not only do the questions asked and surveys employed by the different institution differ, but so do the subjective opinions and perceptions of corruption of the experts, thus begging the question “what does the index really measure?”. This is particularly problematic due to the cultural and gendered differences in how individuals perceive corruption.
3.1.2. The International Country Risk Guide

The ICRG is published by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group in order to assess the political stability of the countries covered by the Index. The ICRG takes into account government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality.

The PRS group describes the corruption measured in the ICRG as the “corruption within the political system” considered from the perspective of being a threat to foreign investment. According to the official description of the Index, while it takes into account forms of corruption met directly by business (such as bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment etc), it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption including acts such as patronage, nepotism, secret party funding, suspiciously close ties between politics and business etc.

The PRS group, however, doesn't provide any information on the methodology used for the collection of data and construction of the index. This brings into question the methodology used to develop the index.

3.1.3. World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption

The Worldwide Governance Indicators were created in 1996 by the World Bank as a tool for broad cross-country comparisons and governance trends evaluations over time. They are built by the aggregation of a list of concepts from data sources such as (a) surveys of households and firms, (b) NGOs, (c) commercial business information providers and (d) public sector organizations, used to apprehend the quality of a country in its political development. “If you cannot measure it,” Lord Kelvin famously remarked, “you cannot improve it.” By supplying the tools to measure governance and monitor changes in its quality, the World Bank and other research enterprises have helped reshape the framework within which governance reforms are implemented, not only by giving us a better and deeper understanding of countries’ strengths and weaknesses, but also by offering insights and evidence of how reforms can generate development dividends.

The World Governance Indicators have six indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.

Our focus here is on the ‘Control of Corruption’ indicator, which aims at “capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption”. It gathers 42 different concepts from 22 different institutions from all around the world, covering over 200 countries. More precisely, it is constructed by picking one or several concepts from a source, averaging together the numerous corresponding data and creating a weighted average. This creates a model within which all the concepts are graded.

While the choice of concepts studied is quite broad, as it gathers perceptions from the population in general and from business specialists, none of them focus on gender. Nonetheless, the quasi-exhaustive list of factors at stake in the comprehension of corruption helps to grasp the overall complexity of the matter, in a way that the diversity of the
indicators shows that the corruption is generally spread, and cannot exist in a single and unique form. According to the WGI team, it seems unlikely that there would be many countries with high judicial corruption but low administrative corruption, and vice versa. A fact reinforced by the data. For example, for Control of Corruption in 2005, the median correlation of the 18 underlying data sources with the aggregate indicator is 0.85, and only two data sources are correlated at less than 0.5.

By summing up, and thus distorting the indicators, the World Bank has drawn several critiques from renowned experts, to whom it responds in a specific paper⁵. Those criticisms, coming from four articles (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Knack, 2006; Kurtz and Shrank, 2006 and Thomas, 2006), are among the most recent written using the WGI, and while the first two use the indicators to conduct a specific survey, the latter are only critiques of the WGI.

Each of the 11 critiques focuses on a certain aspect of the WGI, either about the accuracy of the index, or about its components, bringing a new angle to the whole picture.

Among them, we can find:

- changes over time in some of the individual indicators underlying the WGI aggregate indicators reflect corrections of past errors rather than actual changes (Knack, 2006);
- the WGI are too imprecise to permit meaningful comparisons of governance over time or across countries, given the diversity of the sources (Arndt and Oman, 2006);
- the individual data sources underlying the WGI, particularly those from commercial risk rating agencies, make correlated errors in their assessments of governance (Kurtz and Shrank, 2006), and thus are less informative about governance than they appear;
- the aforementioned correlations give too much weight to such indicators, and distort the index (Arndt and Oman, 2006).

The World Bank responds these critiques in a precise and detailed paper, by deconstructing them and explaining the ways to use the indicators, and why they have done their best to establish a coherent, and simple index, by gathering all the different data, and trying to render the more comprehensive data set. Kaufmann and Kraay, the two creators of the WGI, explain remarkably the methodology used to construct the index, as well as the one needed to read it and to use it. They think that this process of discussion and debate of these critiques is very useful in identifying – but also often discarding – potential problems that arise in efforts to measure governance:

> The WGI also explicitly report margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. Even after taking these margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country and over-time comparisons. (Kaufmann and Kraay 2010: 20).

From one year to another, several changes were made in the index: new countries and institutions were added, and adjustments in the measuring calculations were made. This causes problems in the evaluations of the results and undermines its utility for our research purposes. The WGI team explains extensively why this is not a real critique, but rather a misunderstanding about how the cross-countries comparisons works, and notably says that

> On average, we found that the addition of data sources accounted for only about 9 percent of the variation in changes in our aggregate indicators, for

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3.1.4. The Global Corruption Barometer

The Global Corruption Barometer is a mixed perception- and experience-based index organized by Transparency International since 2003. It asks for people's views on corruption in their country and also provides a measure of their experience of bribery in the past year across eight different services.

The 2013 edition of the Barometer surveyed approximately 1,000 people from each of the 107 chosen countries. The survey sample in each country was weighted to be nationally representative where possible although in six countries, the sample was only urban.

The survey questionnaire was translated into local languages and used for face-to-face, telephone, and online interviews depending on the country context. The 2013 edition was carried out on behalf of Transparency International by the survey company WIN/GIA. In 2013, 114,270 people were surveyed in 107 countries, compared to 100 countries in the 2010/2011 series, 69 countries in 2009 and only 43 in 2003. Questions change year-to-year, with some cycling in and out.

The survey asks people how effective they think their respective governments have been in stopping corruption and also probes their willingness to get personally involved in the fight against corruption.

More precisely, the survey provides information on:

- Which countries report high or low levels of petty bribery;
- Which sectors/institutions are considered most affected by corruption;
- Attitudes towards the government’s effectiveness in fighting corruption;
- Attitudes towards reporting corruption;
- Attitudes on what sort of behavior constitutes corruption.

Unlike most other indexes, the GCB allows for disaggregation of data by gender, income, age group and urban/rural residence. Also unique is the fact that the GCB uses public opinion poll data; and therefore can show ordinary people’s views on the state of corruption as it affects them. Capturing individual citizens’ views, as opposed to expert opinion or business-based perceptions, the Barometer allows us to better understand how corruption affects people and is particularly relevant in countries where formal accountability processes are weak and people's views would otherwise not be heard.

While these particularities might make the Barometer a better option for accessing levels of corruption among women than other indexes, as the TI Corruption Perceptions Index and the WB Worldwide Governance Indicators, several criticisms can be made.

Among its main weaknesses is the fact that people’s responses to the survey are influenced by multiple internal factors, as personal experience, different understandings of corruption and fear of reprisals; as well as external aspects, such as media coverage, freedom of information and level of democracy (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2012).

Other than that, the Barometer is also criticized on the basis of its standardized and superficial nature. As mentioned before, there is currently a shift from large and globally applicable surveys for more nuanced ones, that focus on the local and regional levels of certain practices (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2009). As the latter are not entitled to
3.1.5. Main criticisms regarding corruption indices

3.1.5.1. Problems with perception based indices

Corruption cannot be measured directly, as it is an activity that is deliberately hidden. Thus, the measure of corruption takes into consideration epiphenomenal occurrences that in the view of the experts consulted point to the existence of corruption. This presents us with two distinct problems:

1. Studies have shown that there exists a large margin of error between perceptions and actual occurrences of a phenomenon, and this is also true for corruption (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). It has also been shown that perceptions of corruption diverge greatly from actual experiences in corruption, as the factors that are argued to cause corruption systematically bias perceptions away from experience (Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014).

2. Perceptions influencing perceptions: the result is that a country that is rated as highly corrupt is likely to be perceived as more corrupt than it actually is owing to the index (Cobham, 2013). Thus, perceptions of corruption are subject to strong biases based on the result of the previous rankings of a country, reducing the reliability of such indices.

3.1.5.2. Elite Bias

The CPI collects data on corruption perceptions from a small group of experts and businesspeople, which, as has been pointed out by Alex Cobham (2013: online), “embeds a powerful and misleading elite bias in popular perceptions of corruption”, thus creating the possibility of inappropriate policy responses (Provost, 2013). Business people see corruption and are faced with corruption in different ways and contexts in comparison to the general population. Taking into consideration only their perceptions limits the scope of the results and can lead to conclusions that hold true only for a small sample of the society. Additionally, through their research, Razanfindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) found that experts systematically overestimated the incidence of “corruption” and the tolerance of local people to “corruption.” The same holds true for the World Bank Indicators.

3.1.5.3. Cultural Bias

All three main indices are constructed by institutions that were founded and are currently based in the West and global North, thus, such indices have been criticized for their inherent western, business consensus and post-colonial domination in the construction. For instance, De Maria calls the definition of corruption employed by the CPI “a standard, off the shelf, business centric, culture blind”, particularly in the African context (de Maria, 2008: 779).

3.1.5.4. Gender Bias

None one of the three most popular indices, (i.e. the CPI, World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the ICRG) provide information aggregated on the basis of
gender. The same is valid for the institutions providing data for the construction of the index, as none of them explicitly take into account the gender dimension of corruption.

This brings into question the usefulness of these indices in analyzing corruption in the context of gender. Javier Urra (2007) calls this the “utility problem”. The indices provide an overall perception of the level of corruption in different countries, making the measure extremely broad, thus rendering the data unusable for inferring specific policy interventions. Related to the elite and cultural bias, and to the utility problem is the low representation of women in the group of experts consulted. Corruption is perceived and experienced differently by women for a series of reasons (Transparency International, 2000; Transparency International, 2016; Transparency International, 2010; Hossain, Nyamu Musembi & Hughes, 2010). Given the large gender gaps in education, entrepreneurship, employment and political participation (World Economic Forum, 2013), the fact that women’s participation is not explicitly taken into consideration in the collection of data puts into doubt the representation of their experiences and perceptions in the indices. This in turn raises the question of the relevance of these indices, and particularly in the context of gender and corruption. These indices take into account corruption at an elite level, where there is a clear deficit of women’s participation: the proportion of women taking part in corrupt practices, and experiencing them is extremely low. Thus, we can question the conclusions made on the subject of gender and corruption using such data.

Therefore, it can be argued that through the data provided by the CPI, World Bank Indicators and ICRG, even after econometric analysis, it is not fruitful to draw a causal link between higher participation of women and lower corruption levels. Hence, the policy recommendation of increasing the participation of women in institutions in order to battle corruption lacks scientific backing.

The drawbacks of the indices indicate that there is much work to be done in order to develop a measure of corruption that would best reflect the actual state of corruption. The fact that most indices are aggregates of different information turns the complex concept of corruption into one that is oversimplified, particularly as it is unable to take into account differences in culture and gender. In this sense, the validity of the results obtained from conducting quantitative analysis using such indices to decipher the relation between gender and culture must be scrutinized before acceptance.
3.2. A Gendered and Feminist analysis of the research on gender and corruption

Mapping out the controversy on gender and corruption implies looking at the research, the results, and the different claims that have been made based on the findings. It also involves analyzing the methods and methodologies used to produce the research and results used to make those claims. Furthermore, as the topic at hand revolves around the possible relationship between gender and corruption, it calls for a gendered and feminist analysis of not only the findings, but of the scientific production itself of those findings. This part of the paper will proceed to first analyze through a gendered and feminist lens the scientific practice and methods of the research on gender and corruption, in order to highlight some of the gaps inherent in the field, and to provide a critique of the methods and the scientific knowledge produced. The argument goes that as the production of these results is deeply flawed, so are the results. We go as far as to claim that the starting point of the controversy and the research, which was to essentially hypothesize ‘are women less corrupt than men?’ and to prove it scientifically, is in and of itself biased and reductionist. It originates from the contextual value of social scientists and scientific knowledge, and is reproducing the stereotypes and values it may be even seeking to dismantle.

3.2.1. Science is not neutral: the need for feminist science

The discussion on gender and corruption started with the founding academic articles we discussed in part one. The desire to scientifically explain a perceived correlation by those scientists, and other organizations like the World Bank lead to the development of the “fairer sex” argument as well as a variety of responding critiques. Aside from the purpose of mapping the controversy on gender and corruption, presenting the different sides, and their main arguments, we will also offer a gendered and feminist analysis of the science and the topic.

First, it’s important to start with the idea that science is not neutral. We refer to the term “science” as “a method of inquiry, a historically changing collection of practices, a body of knowledge, a set of claims, a profession, a set of social groups, etc.” (Longino, 1987), and there is a persistent myth of ‘scientific neutrality.’ The veil of neutrality hides this ‘practical’ aspect of the production of scientific knowledge, and the fact that we are not constructing ‘neutral knowledge’ (Flavia and Madureira, 2009). As Helen Longino explains, “sciences are governed by real values and normative constraints generated by the goal of scientific activity, which is to produce an explanation of the natural world”, and thus “the values and constraints involved in considerations of what counts as a good explanation will govern these activities” (1983). Even the trends and choices of areas of inquiry and emphases, such as gender and corruption, are influenced by contextual values (Longino 1983). Longino (1983: 8) defines contextual values as the “social and cultural context in which science is done,” while “constitutive values’ govern scientific knowledge and are the source of the rules determining what constitutes acceptable scientific practice or method”. There is also this enduring idea that what we see as ‘good science’ that does not fudge numbers, is neutral science and value free, despite that there are just as many “departures from internal constitutive norms and constraints of science” (Longino, 1983: 16).
In this paper, we agree with Longino that it is no longer possible “in a century that has seen the splintering of the scientific disciplines, to give such a unified description of the objects of inquiry, despite the belief that it’s science’s ‘job to discover fixed relations of some sort, and that application of observation, experiment and reason leads ineluctably to unifiable, if not unified, knowledge of an independent reality” (Longino 1987: 57). This is also true with gender and corruption, as there is no unified proven theory on the relationship or causation between the two, but the pressure on “science for immediate answers regardless of the lack of consensus among scientists” has led to the controversy at hand (Longino, 1983: 14).

Therefore, because science is not neutral and carries social and cultural values and biases, when looking at research on gender, it becomes important to in turn produce feminist science and analysis. As Donna Haraway (1988: 580) aptly puts it, “we need an earth-wide network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledges among very different -and power-differentiated – communities,” which is vastly more useful for a topic that sets out to understand corruption, and the effects of gender, than the ‘traditional’ “search for translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality-which [she] calls reductionism." The goal here is to understand the connection (or lack thereof) between gender and corruption, both highly complex, value charged, hard to define phenomenon. This involves “understanding how these visual systems work, technically, socially, and psychically” which is what “ought to be a way of embodying feminist objectivity” (Haraway 1988: 583). Therefore, in order to fully comprehend the controversy, this section of the paper will favor along with Harraway:

A practice of objectivity that privileges contestation, deconstruction, passionate construction, webbed connections, and hope for transformation of systems of knowledge and ways of seeing. I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims (Haraway, 1988: 585).

In light of the science methods and practices we’ve analyzed in the paper, the focus of this section is the process-based approach of feminist science, and the ‘doing of science’ (Longino 1987). As feminist theoretical natural science has concealed an ambiguity between content and practice, the precision should be of note. The previous sections of the paper have already provided criticism on the research methods each argument that has fed the controversy.

Referring to, but not repeating section 1.1. Founding Papers and 3.1 Measuring Corruption, it is clear that the methods are questionable. These studies have, in effect, aggregated the results yielded by cross national studies and data, and statistical methods such as multiple regression analysis, the use of many variables, and institutions, different sectors of societies (private and public), all in order to attempt to make widespread predictable claims on gender and its effect on corruption. On the surface, these types of studies, using quantitative and qualitative tools, have detected a statistical correlation between two variables, gender and corruption and have sought to explain it. This section deconstructs that connection. Dr. Lena Wängnerud expressed the value of these studies for the field in her interview with us, as one of the researchers producing them, and explained how they are also more highly valued and done more frequently in the field of academic research than more qualitative research studies. “For me, it is very important to have different perspectives and a variety of methodologies going on. But, unfortunately, cases are based on experimental research.
They tend to be more recognized than qualitative research” (interview with Dr. Lena Wängnerud, March 2016).

3.2.2. Highlighting gaps and discrepancies in the gender and corruption research

This section analyzes how the controversy has produced biased science that reinforces stereotypes. First, it covers the issues related to the measure of corruption used in the indices, specifically in relation to gender and the importance that culture plays in defining and categorizing what corruption includes. Next, it presents a critique of the use of the term “gender” itself in a controversy that in reality focuses on the question of sex categories and corruption. Thirdly, it discusses the fact that the controversy does not adequately address intersectionality. Finally, the section touches on the lack of a sufficient sample size to fully understand the difference between men and women’s level of corruption.

3.2.2.1. In the measure of corruption

Indeed, these studies do have value, however, the indexes, and sample sizes, and the way they were collected and explained in the first place, and along with the quick and easy conclusions, paint a very blurry picture of gender and corruption. When we take all these elements together, the scientific practice and methods become problematic. As it has been stressed multiple times, corruption is very difficult to define and measure, as have the complexities of women’s representation, whether descriptive and substantive, and their general presence in position of powers, the opportunities or lack thereof, and so on. Yet, these studies attempting to explain the correlation and cited for their findings propose flawed definitions, measures, and methods in order to make claims and provide policy advice. As Anne-Marie Goetz explains, through a feminist perspective, that accumulation becomes problematic, and so do those methods. In her interview on the subject, she explained that “there is a place for these studies and large cross national studies, and I find them valuable, but I find it very hard to make the same conceptual leaps that World Bank statisticians make, between national levels of corruption and women in parliament” (interview with Anne-Marie Goetz, April 2016).

Dr. Heather Marquette finds that the definition of corruption changes from culture to culture. In her article, Marquette (2012) quotes Daniel J. Smith who speaks about culture in Nigeria. For Nigerians corruption encompasses many different practices including cheating in school, deceiving a lover, and homosexuality. Naomi Hossain, during her interview, mentioned that women may indeed take part in corrupt practices that are not usually taken into consideration. This is true for women who do not go to work as a result of their family responsibilities. “Everyone is very forgiving, which is nice for the women and their families, but what about the kids in the schools?” (interview with Naomi Hossain, March 2016). Not only do conventional definitions of corruption omit certain practices but this example demonstrates as well that the definition of corruption is gendered. Women practices, as part of their gender role, are overlooked as corruption since the definition of corruption is derived from male practices in Western countries. Anne-Marie Goetz (2016: interview) states,
your question. So the way corruption is measured- it’s so hard to measure as everyone knows- it has always been measured by popular perceptions, some people’s perceptions of corruption, and if you look at perception surveys, including Transparency International, especially the World Bank, the perception surveys are about the perceptions of business, not about women’s perceptions of corruption, not about poor people’s perceptions, not about rural people’s perceptions. It’s about business people’s perceptions, and that desperately biases the measures of corruption in favor of elite, so in that sense the methodology is deeply flawed in my view. I think of much more use, and of course I haven’t been able to do this, would be qualitative studies of levels of corruption that kind of look at it at women’s perceptions, ordinary people’s perceptions, but also look at the patterns of corruption, the how to’s, how the patterns and methods of being corrupt are available to women.

When asked why there are disparities in how countries define corruption, Dr. Marquette (2016) mentioned in her interview that

Corruption is about what takes away from the good life or living a good life. For that, even within countries there will be very different people [they will] have a very different idea of what constitutes a good life (…) and it depends a lot on all sorts of factors dealing with history and culture and class and religion (…) So it seems more plausible that there would be millions of different definitions, I suppose, than one universal definition.”

According to Dr. Marquette, the definition of corruption should be dependent of various cultural factors. This would infer that measurements of corruption could not be comparable across cultures. She asserts during her interview that the CPI was not been intended to be used as be a measurement tool, claiming that “it gets misused when it’s used for research, but we all do it because it is handy” (interview with Heather Marquette, April 2016). Even when one breaks down corruption into different practices, a single indicator would be difficult to measure these very different practices of corruption.

De Maria (2008) argues that the CPI’s definition of corruption is culture blind, which has serious implications since cultural differences will affect the way that the indices are conceived and used. Helen Longino (1983) makes the argument that science and the rules governing what constitutes and governs science are influenced by social and cultural values. “Good science” is not “value-free.” If we take de Maria’s argument into consideration, those who conceived the corruption indices are using one definition of corruption based on Western cultural values to research and compile data from different cultures that may, instead, associate with different definitions of corruptions. This leads to data that may not be reliable or exact since many other factors may be omitted. Sexual extortion and exploitation (Sida, 2015) are other corruption practices that affect women, but are not always cited as corruption in any of the levels of corruption.

Cultural bias also, has an effect on the way that these corruption indices are being used. “The social and cultural stakes of the outcomes of such research can themselves affect the norms and constraints governing” (Longino, 1983) the arguments made concerning the link between corruption and gender. As stated by Dr. Marquette, many researchers use these indices because they are handy. Many of the articles referenced within this white paper are articles that aim to combat corruption using women as a tool to do so. Corruption is considered a critical matter for many governments and the international community. The search for a solution to corruption has therefore high stakes. The CPI, as Dr. Marquette mentioned, was not intended to be used as a measurement tool, but several researchers have used the corruption indices to not only measure corruption, but also compare across
different countries in order to justify the link between high women participation in the public space and lower levels of corruption.

3.2.2.2. On the use of the term ‘gender’

Therefore, not only is there a profound issue with the sexist methods of measurement of corruption, skewing the entire analysis, and actively excluding women and women’s perceptions from its data, but a problem also lies with the measurement and definition of gender in these studies. Let us recapitulate, according to West and Zimmerman (1987: 127):

Sex: Sex is a determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons as females or males. The criteria for classification can be genitalia at birth or chromosomal typing before birth, and they do not necessarily agree with one another.

Placement in a sex category is achieved through application of the sex criteria but in everyday life, categorization is established and sustained by the socially required identificatory displays that proclaim one’s membership in one or the other category. In this sense, one’s sex category presumes one’s sex and stands as proxy for it in many situations, but sex and sex category can vary independently.

Gender in contrast is the activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category – gender activities emerge from and bolster claims to membership in a sex category.

Interestingly enough, although most papers, reports, and articles look into gender and corruption, little to none seem to use the term gender correctly. The research analyzes sex categories and sex differences, and compares and contrasts one category against the other. As Anne-Marie Goetz (2016) again puts very clearly in her interview:

If you mean women say women, and if you mean men, say men, - but all I can really say is that I agree with that and it helps to be more specific.

Studies looking into different behavior of sex-categories are not devoid of value, but when they use a definitional term incorrectly, and create data based upon that definition, surely it indicates some contextual values of scientists, and suggests that the idea of neutral, value free scientific knowledge does not exist. Reinforcing the argument that those values leak into research methods and thus findings, subconsciously or not. Furthermore, as Ana Flávia do Amaral Madureira (2009: 139) adds:

Common beliefs in daily life about gender differences between men and women are facilitated by the reductionism of certain kinds of ‘scientific’ discourses that present women and men as if they were members of opposite and non-overlapping groups.

These ‘scientific discourses’ become trickier when “scientific knowledge is socially demanded in the direction of ‘proving’ these gender differences as ‘natural facts’” (Madureira, 2009). Even more worrisome:

Rigid and hierarchical gender distinctions (sexism) are directly related to the reproduction of non-permeable boundaries between masculinity and femininity, between heterosexual population and the GLTB (Gays, Lesbians, Transgender and Bisexuals) population (Madureira, 2009: 145).

The feminist analysis of these studies reveals that “the models themselves determine the relevance and interpretation of data” and therefore they need to be more closely looked at (Longino, 1990: 189). This section ceases to be passive “with respect to the data and what
the data suggest... [and shows that] value free science is not just empty, but pernicious" (Longino: 1990: 191).

### 3.2.2.3. Overlooking intersectionality

Furthermore, not only has science on gender and corruption mostly used the word gender to mean sex, or characterize women as a group in opposition to men, but it has also failed to deconstruct that group and has created the false notion that women are a monolithic homogenous body of individuals. As Donna Haraway (1988: 589) reminds us “feminism is about a critical vision consequent upon a critical positioning in inhomogeneous gendered social space,” and thus that is the position of this section is attempting to demonstrate. Same as Haraway’s (1988: 594) feminist theory, “as discourse obligated to its sources in many heterogeneous accounts of the world” this section aims to rectify the silence and flattening of women as individuals in science on gender and corruption. It is through the concept of intersectionality that the glaring biases and deep flaws within the research tools on corruption and gender alike (indexes, population samples, etc.), as well the language and analysis by the researchers, become apparent. By continuously saying women, or female, and using variables that do not take into account intra group differences, it creates biased analysis and data.

Intersectionality is simply the idea that systems and feelings of oppression are plural. The concept tries to measure the impact of multiple discriminations – such as sex, race, disability, sexual orientation, social position and so on. The concept is based on the understanding that women (and men) have multiple identities and thus can be victim of multiple levels and kinds of discrimination. Anne Marie Goetz hit the nail on the head when she talked of whose perceptions were included in corruption indexes. Whose voices are heard is at the crux of the dilemma at hand. Crenshaw (1989) provides a poignant example of intersectional discrimination when she describes the dual discrimination of black women due to both their race and sex; Faure (2015: online) summarizes Crenshaw’s argument of intersectionality nicely, explaining that:

*Black women are not discriminated against because they are women or because they are black, they are discriminated against because they are black women. This is what must serve intersectionality: reveal the specific situations often hidden. There is a different relationship of domination in this case, which is multiple.*

Silence and unawareness is another form of discrimination, and little has been done to see if women of color and/or who are not heterosexual tend to have different attitudes and behavior towards corruption. These gendered differences are worth looking at to get a better, clearer more intrinsic picture at the effects of gender on corruption.

### 3.2.2.4. Lack of adequate and representative samples

As previously mentioned, not only is measuring corruption complicated because it is hard to define, but it’s even trickier to measure women’s participation in corruption, and compare it to men’s due to the lack of an adequate sample size. Thus, even if researchers were to look at women and men as categories, the findings would be inconclusive due to the lack of proportional representation. Indeed, when we look at the representation of women in politics and in the private sector, there are not enough women in power at the moment to be able to compare and contrast with men adequately, and come up with significant results. Especially
when studying different types of corruption, such as grand corruption, women rarely make up significant proportions of parliament, board of directors, CEOs, and other positions of power. Thus, it becomes difficult to compare how they act in the face of corruption, compared to men who make up most of the actors, and who have been in those positions longer.

In his interview, Frederic Brassac, who works as an Advisor to the Head of Service at the Service Central de la Prévention de la Corruption in France, explained what they wrote in their annual report:

The SMACL [French insurance agency for local bureaucracies] did some statistics about corruption on local officials. They reported men or women condemnations. But they say that we must take into account the small number of women mayors. 5% of court decisions were women’s corruption but women represent only 13.8% of local elected officials in France [in 2008].

In this Service, because they are working with the French Ministry of Justice, they registered only 247 condemnations in France. As Brassac (2016: interview) said: “that doesn’t reflect the corruption phenomena at all.”

Therefore, how can we determine if women are more corrupt than men when we’re analyzing such a small percentage of the group? There can be no significant conclusion when the sample size of analysis is so small and skewed. The lack of differentiation between the women in those small samples strengthens the production of homogeneous categories and groups, which only highlights the glaring lack of diversity, and possibility for an analysis on intersectionality within those results.

Comparing sample groups with such high inequality in numbers creates a sample bias, and it is what Longino (1983) would call ‘bad science’, misusing the constitutive values of scientific methods. As women do not have the same access and opportunity to corruption that men do, and the sample size is so unequal, it becomes methodologically unsound to make claims on the behavior of an entire sex category based on those numbers. The lack of adequate sample size serves as an additional reminder that these samples aren’t representative, adding to the already difficult task of deconstructing numbers and results, and thus reinforces the deeply flawed methods used in the research and the results that they engender. Until equality is achieved, we will not be able to determine if women are more or less corrupt, and the differences in behavior between women.

3.2.3. The dangerous implications

Thus, not only will we not be able to scientifically prove with acceptable scientific methods until equality is achieved, but is asking ourselves the question, are women more or less corrupt than men, a useful question? Will there ever be an answer, and do we want one?

If we circle back to what science does: it seeks generalizations (Madureira 2009), and in view of the relations between: (a) stereotypes; (b) prejudices; and (c) discrimination (Longino 1983), asking that question, and the multiple answers it will generate, may not be the direction feminists and researchers want to head towards. Social psychology glossaries⁶ provide the following definition of a stereotype: “a belief about the personal attributes of a group of people. Stereotypes are sometimes overgeneralized, inaccurate, and resistant to new information.” Meyers (1995) defines prejudice as “a no justifiable negative attitude in front of a group and its individual members” (cited in Madureira, 2009: 143). Thus,

⁶ [http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/0072413875/student_view0/glossary.html]
stereotypes differ from prejudices, but they can “promote prejudices” and even play an active role in their development (Madureira, 2009: 143).

Taking into account that each sex category is treated as homogeneous, Madureira’s (2009) analysis of the methodological issues of the construction of scientific knowledge in gender issues becomes salient to our discussion. The abstract of her article, “When Stereotypes Become ‘Scientific’ Statements: Dealing with Gender Issues,” excellently describes the issues at stake:

The theoretical analysis by Watzlawik (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 2009) demonstrates the scientific fragility of the constructs of masculinity and femininity based on the oversimplification and overlapping between three levels of analysis: group differences, inter-individual differences and intra-individual differences. Watzlawik presents fresh and relevant contributions in terms of methodological issues, especially about the construction of scientific generalizations. Here [Madureira] focus on issues related to the transformation of stereotypes in statements about gender differences that claim to be ‘scientific’—outlining the socio-political agendas of such statements.” There are diverse risks through the distinct moments involved in the construction of abstract generalizations. When these risks are not overcome the result is the presentation of statements full of reductionists under the label of ‘scientific knowledge’. Surely, these reductionists present implications beyond the ‘walls of universities’, beyond the boundaries of ‘scientific discourses’ (Madureira, 2009: 138).

Moreover, most of the gender binary, blindness to diversity is subtle and thus the feminist challenge is to “wake up sleeping metaphors, hidden within the scientific content of texts—that are all the more powerful for it” (Martin, 1991: 501), such as the metaphor of the fairer sex. It is a feminist challenge to ensure that researchers, and readers, and more importantly policymakers need to become aware of the cultural imagery projected onto science, to be able to fight against the gender stereotypes in broad daylight, and to disempower these common social beliefs that have become so natural (Martin, 1991). The implications of perpetrating gender binaries ideas, and stereotypes unconsciously (or purposely) through science are real and can be dangerous. Again, Anne Marie Goetz (2016: interview) explains the dangers plainly:

It seems to me that the interest in women and politics is a kind of a double edged sword, in the sense that it is very dangerous to claim that simply the physical presence of women in decision making will result in desirable outcomes without addressing many, many other things, such as the nature of the state, the prevailing culture of decision making, the dominant political parties. It is thrilling to think that you know there is a correlation between more women in politics and better outcome in term of better decision making, less corruption, cleaner politics but what also strikes me is that it is in the first place simplistic because it doesn’t take into account many other conditions for women’s political effectiveness. And in a second place potentially it’s a dangerous sort of correlation [emphasis added] to make because if women don’t deliver lower corruption or if they deliver worst decision making then the instrumental argument for putting them in power is disproven, and that’s actually extremely dangerous.

By continuing to frame the question and the thesis as a plausible question that merits an answer, the inherent issues plaguing the science will live on. In other words, by simply asking ourselves as social scientists, if women, as a whole group, act more corruptly than men, as a whole group, we run the risk of reinforcing the stereotypes, and prejudices which have pushed us to ask this question in this way in the first place. Even by trying to fight it, under these terms, we risk creating and strengthening a positive feedback loop of gender
stereotypes. Women are not naturally less corrupt, all the researchers interviewed firmly agreed on that in every interview we conducted. Accounting for socialization aspects, and gender determinism, and many other factors at play, the idea that an entire group of people will act the same way in the face of corruption, still does not make sense, and keeps strengthening the idea that women act as a homogeneous group (in opposition to men), whether the answer is yes or no.

It’s important that research, those participating in it, and those subsequently using it, become “answerable for what [they] learn how to see” (Haraway, 1988: 583). These beliefs, reinforced by scientific knowledge permeate in policy. The Peruvian government using women as political cleaners and their anti-corruption force, provides a prime example. Therefore, instead of focusing on demystifying an entire sex category, and separating them from the rest of their identity, time would be better spent looking into how people, who are a product of their gender, race, sexuality, politico-eco-social background and so on, act in certain cases, and avoid reproducing stereotypes, or erasing individuals from the process of science.
Conclusion

The controversy started with the founding papers, Dollar et. al (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), researching the connection between gender and corruption. These two articles find that women were correlated with lower levels of corruption, reinforcing the discourse that women are ‘the fairer sex’. Our study exposed some of the initial issues with the two founding papers in terms of methodology, while also illustrating how research has created a ‘scientific fact’ and shown a statistical link between women in government and lower levels of corruption. We then presented numerous lab experiments and cultural studies that support the research that women are indeed less corrupt than men.

The second part of our study presented the research on other side of the controversy, which demonstrates that the correlation and, indeed the causation, of the relationship between women and levels of corruption is spurious. These arguments propose that rather than women being inherently less corrupt than men due to their nature, the institutional environment - both formal and informal - explain the relationship. This research claims the liberal democracy, political culture, and accountability mechanisms account for the correlation between women and corruption. Therefore, a fairer system rather than a fairer sex (women) explains decreases in corruption. Thus, the level of corruption cannot solely be determined by the sex of a politician as the political culture and institutional mechanisms also encourage less corrupt behaviors.

The third part of the paper provided an overall critique of the controversy. First, the measurement of corruption was an issue throughout the controversy, so mapping the methods and explaining the basis of the research was the next step. Given our analysis of the different international mechanisms designed to measure and control corruption levels, it is clear that these are fraught with contradictory information and obstacles based on culture and social class. In the end, these shortcomings severely hinder efforts of corruption surveillance, as the validity of certain indices are questioned.

Second, a gendered and feminist analysis of the science production and content of gender and corruption demonstrating the inherent flaws with asking whether women are the fairer sex to analyze the relationship between gender and corruption. Our analysis finds that the underlying process of the creation of science either backing or disproving the link between gender corruption is itself flawed; the controversy has reproduced cultural and contextual values under the guise of constitutive scientific fact. It is thus important that the indexes of corruption, the samples and components of the research start including women of different identities and backgrounds, and start actually addressing gender in its scientific sense, and not the behavior of sex categories.

In conclusion, asking whether or not women are the fairer sex simply reproduces the categorization and gender binary assumptions of society, instead of enabling research to focus on gendered behavior. This would produce a more useful and more representative research content on gender, that would lead to a more accurate and fairer view of the controversy.

1. Does the discussion on gender and corruption matter?

As indicated in our previous sections, during the last two decades a lot of attention has been given to the question of whether women are less corrupt than men. It was only in the last few
years, however, that the international community started to look at the gendered impacts of corruption.

Corruption impacts individuals differently; yet, it affects women the most. One of the reasons why corruption affects women more deeply than men is simply because women make up the majority of the world’s poor. Also, as they are more reliant on public services, they suffer disproportionately when corruption reduces the amount of resources available and are more often denied access to them (Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, 2010). This reality means that corruption is eventually perceived as an intrinsic part of life, and few women are aware that these are criminal acts that violate their human rights (Transparency International, 2013). This lack of awareness often keeps women from raising their voices and denouncing these practices.

In turn, corruption exacerbates the already uneven power dynamics between men and women and reinforces the social, cultural and political discrimination that women face in their daily lives (Transparency International, 2014; Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, 2010). Since women are usually the primary caretakers of their families, they are more likely to experience corruption when enrolling their children in school, seeking medical services or demanding access to government subsidized programs (Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, 2010). A study conducted in South India showed that 50% of women who delivered in maternity hospitals had to pay extra money to have a doctor present during the birth and that 70% had to pay to be allowed to see their babies (WHO, 2007). Another study, conducted in Botswana, indicated that 67% of the girls interviewed reported sexual harassment by their teachers. This had serious consequences to their lives as one out of each ten girls considered stopping their education and the same number reported having consented to sexual relations for fear (U4 Anti-Corruption Research Network, 2010).

Corruption also makes it more difficult for women to gain financial resources, hindering their access to credit and business licenses. While men might use bribes or exchanges of favors to overcome the barriers created by the complicated regulations and extensive legal requirements, women often lack the necessary information and resources to engage with these corrupt networks.

In the public sphere, corruption also imposes several obstacles to women’s political participation as it “prevent[s] women from gaining office, because corrupt political and economic processes often deny them the opportunities to seek and hold public office” (Stockemer, 2011: 695). Thus, corruption discourages their participation in political processes and reduces their opportunities to become an electoral candidate as it is often necessary to be part of the “old boys’ network” to have any chances of success (Transparency International, 2014).

On top of this, there are forms of corruption that affect women more specifically, such as sexual extortion. These types of corruption are even more difficult to be measured and combated as they often escape reporting. They are not always perceived as corruption by their victims and are hardly reported, as women fear the shame and stigmatization that can come with reporting.
2. Where do we go from here?

Despite the serious and disproportionate consequences corruption has on women’s lives, only one fifth of the tools generally used to measure the phenomenon take in consideration gender and poverty determinants. Current measures only look at perceptions and experiences of corruption and don’t examine its direct impact on citizens. Moreover, data is not sex-disaggregated, being inadequate to base policy responses that address women’s and men’s different experiences of corruption (Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, 2010).

There is a greater need for more gender disaggregated corruption data, not only to understand the corruption impact on women but also to examine and better foster the role they can play in fighting it. Furthermore, the scope of the practices investigated must be extended to include sexual extortion. Only rethinking the way corruption is measured and understood we will be able to guarantee women’s full enjoyment of their rights and to eliminate the obstacles corruption imposes on gender equality and on development (U4 Anti-Corruption Research Network 2010).

Obviously, the controversy on gender and corruption is far from being resolved. The question remains if it actually should be resolved, under this framing in any case. Although we may never know whether women are more or less corrupt as a whole, and maybe we don’t need to, but that does not mean that the scientific community of researchers should not look into the gendered outcomes and behaviors of women in corruption- or any social and political phenomenon for that matter. It is important to understand how women and men differently respond to, and are affected by corruption. Once more, Anne Marie Goetz (2016: interview) clearly put things into perspective:

Do women and men experience this the same way and does it have the same consequences on them? […] And secondly do men and women engage in this the same way? I think there is a difference, in the way that men and women engage in corruption. […] It’s partly because of their gender or socialization. And I do think it’s probably true that women tend to be more wary of corruption, […] and that women and men use their gendered networks, and their gendered opportunities available [or not] to them, to engage or fight corruption. To the extent that public institutions are gendered and they provide different opportunities to combat and engage in corruption. A gendered analysis is always absolutely relevant.

Not only is it important to start the research using a gendered lens, to understand the gaps, misconceptions, and links in more accurate and interesting ways, but it is important to use a feminist perspective throughout the process. It is worth asking: if feminist methodologies and tools were used in the production of this research from indices themselves to the conclusion, what would the research and the findings look like?

The scope and goal of this paper may appear limited, but its implications for further research are not. Science production matters and has concrete consequences. Those facing corruption and designing anti-corruption programs need insights on what is happening, and need solutions. Women deserve to be included, and seen as individuals part of system, as they deserve the right to participate in public life without fear that the stereotype will work against them. As important as a gendered lens may be, looking at systems as a whole, along with links and gaps, and other institutions stays just as important. The conclusion of this paper is that that there is no easy answer, and if research is to be conducted on the topic, which we encourage, it should be with greater care to the process and those represented within it.
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